

## THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By George H. Miles, D.Sc., Assistant Director of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London.

THE National Institute of Industrial Psychology was incorporated as a Research Association in 1921, for the practical application of psychology and physiology to human problems in industry and commerce. In the four years which have elapsed since its incorporation, it has carried out investigations in a wide range of occupations, extending from coal mining to work in tea-shops. In spite of the very difficult period through which the country has been passing, it has been able to extend its activities in many directions. In addition to its industrial work, a Vocational Section has been established, in order that psychological problems concerning Vocational Guidance may be worked out and the results utilised when giving advice to persons requiring guidance in the choice of an occupation. Many firms interested in supplementing their methods of selection, by psychological tests, have sought assistance in this direction, and the Institute has devised and put into operation, tests for turners, fitters, draughtsmen, typists, shorthand clerks, comptomotrists and for a number of other occupations, such as assembly work, weaving, soldering, press work, etc.

Parallel with this growth has come a demand for training in the methods and for practice in devising, administering and evaluating such tests. Several firms have sent members of their staff for training at the Institute, and numerous Education Authorities interested in mental testing and vocational guidance have sent groups of teachers for short courses or have invited members of the staff of the Institute to deliver lectures and give demonstrations of the work.

In carrying out this work a number of problems have been encountered, which have required special treatment, and from the experience obtained, much more definite methods of attacking industrial problems have been evolved.

The industrial work has been done, in the main part, for private firms. In this respect the work of the Institute differs from that of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, which is concerned with problems common to a number of industries, or common to a large part of an industry. Though individual firms may be

greatly interested in this aspect, they frequently require help in the practical application of the results or need assistance in dealing with their own peculiar difficulties, and to such firms the Institute's work is particularly useful. From its beginning it was realised that the Institute should be an impartial body, that it should keep clear of political controversy, and devote its attention to the common ground, where improved working conditions and improved output were likely to result from its investigations. It was further essential that its recommendations should be of a thoroughly practical nature and of a definite economic value to the firms concerned. It, therefore, began with comparatively limited aims, and its attention has necessarily been mainly confined to every-day problems which were capable of, at any rate, part solution within the limited time of an investigation. In order to obtain results of a scientific nature, much time in each investigation was of necessity taken up in the collection of statistical material, upon which suggestions were based, and it was necessary to test the value of the suggestions under definite control. Finally, the alterations in method had to be clearly defined and put into a thoroughly practical form, so that the improvements could be easily maintained.

In such work it is obvious that much more than mechanical alteration in method is necessary. Without the full co-operation of both workers and managers, such changes are of only temporary value, and in many cases, therefore, an important part of the investigator's task has consisted in changing the outlook of those concerned.

It is a difficult task at first to convince both management and workers of the need for accurate records of what may at first sight appear to be trivial matters, but the results obtained have in the end been so convincing of the value of the work, that some of the larger firms have appointed work psychologists, and it is gratifying to note that other firms have again requested the services of the Institute as new problems have arisen.

In addition to actual investigations, propaganda of an educational nature has been necessary, in order to acquaint both workers and employers of the possibilities of such work. In this task the Institute has been greatly helped by the press accounts of its investigations, often given in the daily press in rather too popular a form, but the technical papers have given more exact details and, in addition, lectures have been given to business clubs, Rotary Clubs, Workers' Associations, Debating Societies, Works Committees, Foremen's Committees, etc. Use has also been made of the extraordinary facilities which broadcasting has given in reaching all classes, and a series of talks has been given on subjects deal-

ing with the Institute's activities. These efforts were at first slow in bearing fruit, but by limiting its investigations to definite, well-defined pieces of work, it has been possible to demonstrate in no uncertain fashion the advantages of the application of psychology to industry. Naturally, it was at first difficult to convince the employer, who is accustomed to decide intuitively or empirically most questions of organisation and management, that there was any need for a prolonged investigation. American experts and "business doctors" had spread the idea that the reforms could be introduced after a rapid survey of a factory or workshop, and, undoubtedly, much on the mechanical side can be done in this way, but on the human side hasty steps may easily involve conditions which, in time, adversely affect the human organism. A high bonus incentive, for instance, may give good results for quite a long period, owing to the men working considerably above capacity, but in the end, unless steps have been taken to facilitate the work, reaction is sure to set in. It is obviously necessary for the Institute's investigations to be spread over as long a period as possible, in order that accurate records of the effect of changes made should be ascertained. In every case the Institute asks for a member of the firm to be directly interested in the continuance of the methods and, furthermore, visits from investigators who have carried out the work, take place periodically after the main investigation has been finished, in order to advise and check work which is being done.

In the course of these investigations problems calling for more extensive research than the limited practical requirements allow, have frequently been encountered. There are problems connected with lighting, for instance, which require much deeper investigation. In the past, lighting engineers have viewed the whole question from the physical side. Measurement of light intensity, etc., though useful as a rough guide, is by no means sufficient when considering the effect of lighting conditions on such an adaptable organ as the human eye, and problems have arisen which required experimental work in the laboratory to help in their solution. In two coal mine investigations, for instance, numerous dark-room experiments have been necessary, in order to establish facts concerning the best type of illumination. Practical application of the results gave an increase in output of 14 per cent.

In some cases it has been possible to obtain assistance from research students at the Universities, and facilities have been granted to the Institute's investigators for carrying out laboratory work connected with investigations. In this way the Psychological Departments of London, Cambridge and Manchester Universities have given great help in a number of problems.

There is, in all directions, great need for much wider research. It is, furthermore, important that the work should be carried out in close association with practical conditions, and it is one of the regrets of the Institute that sufficient funds are not available for work which, when carried out, will have an enormous value in future investigations, and will give solid ground for much that at present has to be decided on quite insufficient data.

Time study plays an important part in the Institute's work, and here again advances have been made. Time study gives a true picture of working sequence, and is valuable from the point of view of records, but this represents only the physical side of the picture. Far more important are the observations which accompany it. Thus a delay of a second or two in a cycle of operations may, from the purely physical point of view, appear insignificant and the elimination of the hindrance which causes this delay may only make a difference of a few minutes in the course of the day, but if such delay, slight as it is, produces in the worker irritation or requires undue strain, the ultimate effect on output is far greater than the mere loss of time indicates. It is at points such as these that the difference between the outlook of the time study expert and psychologist is seen. From the mechanical aspect the time saved may be insignificant, but from the human point of view, there may be an immense saving of energy which can be more effectively applied in actual work. In one of the Institute's investigations the time taken in assembling certain articles was reduced by 35 per cent., by attention to a number of apparently insignificant points at which time was lost, but the reduction in fatigue was so marked that the workers thanked the investigator for his help.

In movement study, too, much more than the mechanical aspects must be taken into account by the psychologist. In many instances it has been found that apparently unnecessary movements are in reality serving useful physiological purposes, and where movements involve considerable strain, it may often be advantageous to increase the number of movements and so reduce the incidence of mental or physical strain on the worker. Thus, in one investigation an increase in output of 40 per cent. was obtained by such procedure, though the number of movements was doubled.

Another group of problems frequently having a common psychological basis is that concerned with waste in production, caused by the so-called "carelessness" or lack of "conscientiousness" of the workers. By seeking the cause of such faults it has frequently been found that such waste is in a large measure caused by fatigue, irritation, unnecessary frequency of handling and in poor

environmental conditions, such as bad lighting, insufficient air circulation or high temperature. By reducing these detrimental factors, large reductions of waste have been obtained. In one case breakages in a catering establishment were reduced by 53 per cent., in another case by 44 per cent., and in another instance waste was reduced by £8 per week. Similar remedies have been found effective where there have been complaints of inefficient inspection of finished articles. In every case the removal of extraneous strain has, naturally, had a beneficial effect on the worker's well-being.

In many industrial occupations, especially in light repetitive work, it has for a long time been recognised that rest pauses have a beneficial effect. The frequency and duration of these has, however, largely been determined by rule of thumb methods, and but little accurate experimental work has been done. The Institute has, on several investigations, experimented in this direction, and increases of output of from 5 to 10 per cent. have been obtained. It has found, too, that even better results may, in particular cases, be obtained by change of work, and laboratory experiments have recently pointed to the fact that a complete rest is not always the best means of recovery. In a spinning mill recent experience has shown that even in this industry, where production is so largely dependent on machinery, better work and increased output can be obtained by suitably organised pauses. An analysis of work curves obtained before and after the introduction of the pause shows the interesting fact that in this instance the improved output extends over the whole spell, and seems to indicate that the anticipation of breaks in an otherwise monotonous four hours spell has produced a definite effect on the first half-hours' work.

As had been stated previously, considerable progress has been made in devising tests for various occupations, and in this work the Institute has gained valuable experience, though at many points problems have arisen which required new methods of approach. It is often extremely difficult in industry to obtain sufficiently large groups of workers to form the basis of a thorough statistical evaluation of the tests that are devised. Even when a consistent group is available trade fluctuations are at any time liable to interfere with experimental conditions. There are difficulties, too, in obtaining accurate ranking of performance, and it is obviously absurd to attempt to apply elaborate statistical methods unless a reliable ranking can be obtained. Experiments in different methods of rating and rating scales are in progress, and promise useful results in the future.

In most industries workers below a certain level of efficiency are eliminated, and members of the resultant group, from this and other causes, frequently show only small differences in ability. The work of determining suitable selection tests is obviously complicated by this fact, and has necessitated the trial of several methods, the validity and usefulness of which can only be determined by a careful "follow up" of results when applied to new candidates. In fact, in all industrial tests this is essential. From a practical point of view the tests that the Institute has devised have evidently given complete satisfaction to the firms concerned, and are undoubtedly a valuable supplement to the older methods of selection, but the Institute is only too well aware of the need for research in the laboratory, and in industry itself, to devise more scientific methods of attacking such problems. Work in this direction is in progress, and special attention is also being given to the development of tests and methods of observation, which will determine such elusive qualities as temperament and other factors which play an important part in a person's success and well-being in a particular occupation.

It will be recognised that although the Institute's activities have covered a wide field, there are many wider problems, such as the value of various incentives in production, measure of the cost to the individual of numerous forms of physical and mental activity, etc., that seem as remote as ever from solution or even the method of approach; but it is felt that at such an early stage in the work it was far better to concentrate on problems within a measurable distance of solution than to dissipate effort on questions which require far more co-operative effort and many more trained investigators that are at present available. By producing definite results it has called attention to possibilities and has interested a wide group of practical men in the human side of industry. Indeed, it may be truly said of all the Institute's work, that its influence is far greater than can be measured by the mere increase of output recorded in the numerous investigations that it has carried out, and it is hoped that in time this effect will bear fruit in the acknowledgment on the part of industry, of the pressing need for wider research.

## SIGMUND FREUD'S PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THEORY OF THE TABOOS OF THE DEAD.

By Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, M.A., B.Sc., Professor of Philosophy, University of The Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

THE following paper embodies a section of one lecture, delivered as part of a course, on the "Psychology of Primitive Peoples," during the Bantu Studies Vacation Course, organised by the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, in July of the current year.

In writing out my argument for publication, there are two general remarks, I would offer, by way of introduction.

First, like most workers out of reach of well-equipped libraries, I find myself handicapped by lack of access to the periodical literature to which one would naturally turn for critical reviews of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. Hence, it is possible that my criticisms of Freud's treatment of the taboos of the dead, have been anticipated by others without my having been able to discover the fact. Still, even if it be so, the undesigned coincidence of my views and theirs will not be without value. For, such mutual corroboration of conclusions independently arrived at, fulfils in philosophy something of the function which belongs to verification in science. The only critical review of Freud's book which I have seen is W. McDougall's, in *Mind*, N.S., Vol. XXIX, No. 115, pp. 344-350. But McDougall concentrates his attack on Freud's central thesis, viz., the derivation of all totemism and taboo from the "Oedipus Complex," assumed to be present unconsciously in every individual of the human race. With this thesis I am not concerned in this paper, because it does not enter directly into Freud's argument about taboos of the dead. (*Op. cit.*, Brill's transl., pp. 88-108). The reason why I have singled out this one argument for special examination is that it supplies a small-scale, but typical example of certain faults of method in Freud's reasoning concerning the customs and beliefs of primitive peoples. It is, I believe, a "fair sample" of his method, and its unsoundness is representative of the unsoundness of the bulk of the reasoning which fills the pages of *Totem and Taboo*.

My second, and more important, introductory remark is this. Seeing that my argument will be directed *against* Freud's psycho-analytic theory of the taboos of the dead, I want to guard myself explicitly against the inference that, because I criticize Freud adversely on this point, I reject his psycho-analytic theory as a whole. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of what

I think sound and what unsound in that theory. Hence, I must content myself with saying briefly, that, in my judgment, the impulse given to psychology by Freud's work will live, because he has taught us to attend to mental facts which pre-Freudian psychology slurred over or ignored, and to look in a fresh light at the facts which pre-Freudian psychology did try to deal with. His theories have infused psychology with a fresh life, by opening up new lines of research on problems of mental health, of education, of morals. On the other hand, the weakness of Freud's work consists, as I hope to show, in his readiness to apply his theories *ab extra* to facts which have not been dealt with, at first hand, by psycho-analytic methods at all. In this *purely speculative* extension of his theories into fields in which no verification is either attempted, or possible, by the ordinary technique of "analysis," Freud seems to me to lay himself open to grave objections. Just as his analysis of Leonardo da Vinci's dream seems to me to be, not science, but merely fancy—an ingenious guessing game, played with the concepts of his own theory—so I hold that Freud's excursions into the psychology of primitive peoples are, *in method*, equally speculative and equally unscientific, because unverified and unverifiable.

But this brings me to my argument.

The first point to notice is that Freud deals with the customs and beliefs of primitive peoples, not at first-hand, but at second-hand—indeed, it would be truer to say at third-hand. For, the authorities upon whom he relies for his facts, chiefly Frazer, and to a less degree Wundt and Westermarck, themselves report at second-hand the accounts of the ultimate first-hand observers—explorers, missionaries, traders, administrators, field-workers in anthropology, and so on.

One may well doubt, on general principles, the value of a psychological analysis performed at two removes from the living subject. Certainly, Freud's lack of first-hand contact with the beliefs and customs of primitive peoples, as these are actually *lived*, in the concrete context of the daily routine of tribal existence, exposes his conclusions to error from two sources. On the one hand, his faith in his own theories inevitably acts as a pervasive bias in emphasis and selection of facts from among the mass of data offered by his authorities. He cannot help looking at the facts through the glasses of his ready-made theories. He cannot help picking out as significant what is significant only from the point of view of his theories. And, on the other hand, all this speculative combination of facts into pre-conceived patterns is unchecked at any point by any evidence deserving the name of verification. Readers who know only the literature of psycho-

analysis and have no acquaintance with primitive peoples in the flesh, so to speak, may find the argument plausible if not demonstrative. On the other hand, those who study primitive men at first-hand, and let their theories grow out of the facts in their entirety, instead of forcing their theories on the facts, will readily recognise how fanciful and wide of the mark are Freud's analogies. For, analogy is, logically considered, the one and only instrument by which Freud effects the extension of his theories to this field. Now, as every student of Logic knows, the demonstrative value of analogy is nil, though, skilfully used, it may have a considerable heuristic value. To do Freud justice, he generally begins his speculative extensions of psycho-analytic theory with a cautious air of putting forward merely a possible hypothesis, but every attentive reader will notice that, as he warms to his argument, the language of conjecture vanishes and the language of demonstration takes its place. Before long we reach a confident: "It has been shown . . . ." though careful scrutiny reveals not an item of evidence which could raise the bare possibility of the initial hypothesis to the level of demonstrated certainty. Indeed, the whole manner of Freud's exposition is not so much that of a scientific argument, as that of skilful insinuation and suggestion, such as communicates belief in the absence of adequate logical grounds. For, there can be no doubt that Freud throughout is convinced of the truth of his psycho-analytic interpretation of the mentality of primitive peoples, and his argument is designed to induce the same conviction to his readers, not by the irresistible logic of the evidence, but by accustoming them to the psycho-analytic view, until the familiar transmutes the plausible into the certain. I am not, of course, accusing Freud of deliberate deception. If there is deception, he is self-deceived. All I am saying is that his zeal outruns his evidence, and, blunting his critical sense, leads him to extend his theories by reasoning no longer subject to scientific checks.

So far, I have criticised the logical character of Freud's analogical reasoning, on grounds which hold good whatever the details of that reasoning may be. Let us now look at the details themselves. Following his authorities, Freud traces all the taboos of the dead to the belief that the spirit of the departed is hostile, has become an enemy of the survivors—in Wundt's language, a "demon." Hence arises the question, "What is the cause, or source of this hostility, this malevolence?" The dead person may have been honoured and beloved in his lifetime. What transforms him at death into an "evil spirit?" Westermarck, as quoted by Freud, adduces a variety of hypothesis. Death is regarded by all pri-

mitive peoples as a calamity, always due to violence or witchcraft, hence the spirits of the departed are vindictive and resentful. Alternatively, the departed, longing for the company of those still living, seek to draw the latter after them into the land of spirits, and, therefore try to kill them with diseases. Yet, again, the malevolence of spirits is a reflection of the instinctive fear of them, which is, itself, the result of the fear of death. With so much guessing to point the way, Freud has some excuse for thinking that a psycho-analytic guess could not be worse, and might well be better. Might not psycho-neurotic disturbances, by analogy, supply a clue? Such a clue Freud finds in the "ambivalence" of emotions. In all intimate human relationships there is apt to be emotional ambivalence, or, more simply, a conflict of emotions. In the relations of parents to children, of husband to wife, there may be, alongside of genuine affection, much opposition of desires, much friction, much occasion for self-sacrifice and self-repression. That, on occasion, one wishes one's nearest and dearest dead is a common human experience,\* and such death-wishes, which normally never pass from imagination into deed, may occur even in the most loving relationship. Where this inward conflict of affection and hostility becomes extreme, it may give rise to "obsessive self-reproaches" on the part of the survivor. The death so obviously satisfies the repressed death-wish, that the survivor is smitten with pangs of conscience at actual, or imaginary, failures in care and affection.

That such ambivalence of emotions is a common† human experience, though it does not normally give rise to neurotic symptoms, must be conceded at once. It enables Freud to take the first step towards a psycho-analytic theory of taboos of the dead. "We now know how to explain"—note how the language has dropped all suggestions of conjecture—"the supposed demonism of recently-departed souls and the necessity of being protected against their hostility through taboo rules. By *assuming* (italics mine) a similar high degree of ambivalence in the emotional life of primitive races, such as psycho-analysis ascribes to persons suffering from compulsion neurosis, it becomes comprehensible . . . ." (*Op. cit.*, p. 103). By "assuming!" Not a shred of evidence is offered by Freud, or is anywhere discoverable in the literature on which he draws, that primitive men and women are, in fact, subject to the high degree of emotional ambivalence which is found in certain

\*When I say "experience," I mean "experience," i.e., I mean that we do not need to search the "unconscious" to verify the occurrence of such ambivalent attitudes. Freud argues habitually as if death-wishes were normally unconscious. I am sure they are frequently conscious, and consciously rejected by the self.

†By "common," here, I mean "frequent," not "universal."

neurotic patients. Nor is such a morbid degree of emotional ambivalence observable among them when one definitely looks for it in order to verify Freud's assumption.

Moreover, in the neurotic patient the intense emotional conflict issues in obsessive self-reproaches. No one, as Freud admits, has observed among primitive peoples any wholesale liability to obsessive self-reproaches. Negative evidence against Freud's assumption, you say? So an innocent might think, not knowing the power of assumptions. Why not make a further assumption which turns the apparently negative evidence into positive? The armoury of psycho-analysis contains a most convenient weapon for the purpose in the process of *projection*. So convenient is it, that Freud drops the very language of "assumption" for the categorical tones of established fact. Primitive man's hostility against the departed, instead of giving rise to obsessive reproaches, "experiences a different fate; the defence against it is accomplished by displacement upon the object of hostility, namely, the dead." (p. 103). Thus, the hostility really felt by the survivor is by him attributed to the spirit of the departed, and justifies the taboos which the survivor imposes on himself for protection against the evil powers of the "demon." Yet the demon-character of the departed is nothing but the survivor's "unconscious" hostility projected upon the dead man's spirit. Only one further assumption—not, of course, acknowledged as such—is now needed to buttress the structure of assumptions already erected, viz., an assumption to account for the cessation of the taboos of the dead with the end of the appointed period of mourning. Mourning is an expression of tenderness and sorrow; hence, while it lasts the inner conflict with latent hostility towards the departed is acute. But "with the termination of the period of mourning, the conflict also loses its acuteness, so that the taboo of the dead can be abated or sink into oblivion." (*ibid.*, p. 108).

It is, clearly, superfluous to urge, once more, the methodological criticism that the whole theory is nothing but a tissue of assumptions piled upon assumptions; that there is no evidence in the literature for the facts assumed, nor any attempt at verifying the theory by actual study of primitive minds. But there are two other criticisms which must be pressed home in conclusion.

The first consists in exhibiting the arbitrary selection of facts by which Freud lends such plausibility to his theory as it possesses. To look merely at the taboos of the dead is to get a most fragmentary and distorted view of the real attitude of primitive peoples towards the spirits. The taboos must be studied in their context of the *total* relationship in which primitive man believes himself

to be standing, not only towards the departed spirits of his own family, or sib, but towards the whole spirit-world. Of the Bantu peoples of Southern Africa, at any rate, it is simply not true to say that their attitude towards their dead is simply one of fear, or that the dead are to them nothing but malevolent demons. To give a complete account of the relationship in a brief space is impossible. But, for our present purpose, it is enough to say that the living and the dead are conceived to be members of a single community, and that neither can do without the other. The dead have powers the beneficent use of which the living need in their daily business. And the living, in turn, can do much for the well-being of the departed. At the same time, the departed still retain the characters which they had when alive. If they can love, they can also hate; if they can be good-humoured, they can also be angry. When offended, they are vindictive, but they may be placated by suitable offerings. Surely, there is enough here of "ambivalence" of emotions, without having to drag in neurotic analogies. The relationship between the living and the departed is one in which, as in many relationships between the living themselves, trust and affection mingle with fear and suspicion. But any one-sided picture, such as that which Freud has extracted from his authorities, puts the taboos in an utterly wrong perspective.

And there is, secondly and lastly, an even more weighty and incisive criticism. Taboos are social institutions and, as such, have social motives and social functions. This side of the matter—the most important from the point of view of the social anthropologist—Freud completely ignores. Working his analogies both ways, he assimilates the taboos of primitive peoples to certain neurotic phenomena, and *vice-versa*, speaks of some of the practices of neurotic patients as taboos. In either case, he treats taboos as if they were merely phenomena of *individual* psychology, instead of being social phenomena to be explained by *social* laws. The living and the departed, we said just now, form *one* society which, thus, has a visible and an invisible half. The beliefs and practices of primitive peoples can be understood only by realising that their chief concern is to maintain the welfare and stability of this one society by carefully regulating the relations of different groups of individuals in it, according to traditional behaviour-patterns. There are critical transition-points in the life of the individual when he passes from one social stratum to another, assuming in each case a new status with new relationships to his fellows, new rights, new duties. One such transition period is puberty, when, by means of initiation ceremonies, the boy or girl is promoted to a new social status. Another is marriage. A third is death—the transition

from the stratum of the living to the stratum of spirits *within* the society. At each such transition the new adjustment of relationships among the living, and between the living and the departed, has to be brought about by the performance of prescribed rites and the observance of prescribed taboos. The social equilibrium has been upset. These ceremonies and restrictions have the function to restore it. It is to this general conception, and not to fanciful analogies between the minds of primitive men and the minds of neurotic patients, that we must look for the true explanation of the taboos of the dead, as well as of taboos in general.

---

#### NOTES BY THE WAY.

##### No. 10.

###### The Suggestiveness of Great Art.

The most perfect examples of unity of design in great poems outside the drama are unquestionably the *Odyssey* and the *Divine Comedy*. And how much of their greatness they owe precisely to that unity, as St. Paul's owes its greatness very largely to the fact of being the work of one mind from its first stone to its last! When so great a church as St. Paul's, and even more when so great a poem as the *Divine Comedy*, stands complete as a single creation, a whole at unity with itself in all its parts, we may almost be said to seem to have a glimpse of the mind of the Divine Artificer, and to hear in human music some sound of the ultimate harmony of the universe. That is what all great Art is: a discovery of order in the chaos of the world. And the order is more impressive, the harmony more consoling and more final, in proportion to the range and variety of those elements of chaos, in which it is discovered and out of which, indeed, it is built up. That is what gives to the last words of the *OEdipus Coloneus*, of *Hamlet*, and, in some ways above all, of the *Divine Comedy*, so incomparable a power of peace. By themselves they would have no such power. It is because they are part of a whole, because they are felt as giving us the completion of a tremendous circle of great experiences. Art is not philosophy, but it often has in it philosophical suggestions. And perhaps, when we leave *OEdipus* in the secret grave to which he has been so strangely guided, or still more when, with Dante, we gaze in adoration at the Love which moves the sun and the other stars, we have somewhere in us a dim half-conscious sense that a life which art can fit into such wonderful order can scarcely be the life of isolated and meaningless atoms.

—From the *Times Literary Supplement*.

## ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF POPULATION.

By R. C. Mills, LL.M., D.Sc., Professor of Economics, University  
of Sydney.

THE problem of population is far from being merely an economic one. It may be in the near future, as Mr. J. M. Keynes has put it, "the greatest of all social questions—a question which will arouse some of the deepest instincts and emotions of men, and about which feeling may run as passionately as in the earlier struggles between religions."<sup>1</sup>

In any such social problem, too, the aid which Economics can give to its solution is definitely limited. It can do no more than deal with one aspect which must not, however, be thought unimportant. Practical questions are rarely, if ever, decided upon purely economic grounds, because to do this would be to ignore other important non-economic considerations. In practice these have to be balanced one against the other and action taken in accordance with the way in which the balance swings. Economics is powerless to judge of the balance of social advantages and, indeed, does not attempt it. If economic analysis were to show, for example, that an increase in the numbers of children of a group would lead to reduced real incomes all round, it could not determine the question whether it is better to have more income or more children. It would point out that it may not be economically possible to have both, but it would not attempt to measure the value of human life. Population presents distinct problems to the biologist, to the moralist and to the economist. It may, therefore, be convenient to approach the larger social problem by means of one of its aspects separated for purposes of analysis, provided that we always bear in mind that it is only one aspect.

To primitive societies the problem of population was the very practical one of how much food there was to go round. If they were fortunate in the possession of wide and fertile lands, they were apt to look upon an increase in population as a good thing because it meant more food and better defence against enemies. If they were unfortunate enough to have a small country and large numbers an increase in population plainly meant hunger and misery unless they could migrate or conquer other countries. Quite frequently primitive societies solved their problem of population by

\*Read at the Third Annual General Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, held at Sydney, May 21-23, 1925.

(1) Preface to Wright's "Population." (2) Economic Journal, 1910, pp. 390-1. (3) Economic Journal, June, 1924, p. 192. (4) Sir W. Beveridge, in *Economica*, March, 1925, p. 15. (5) Wright, "Population," p. 163.

infanticide and other practices which we are accustomed to think of as peculiarly modern. In this way they deliberately limited their numbers.

In the 17th Century we meet with the idea in England, for example, that there could be too many people living in the country. It is doubtful whether this was an honest belief or whether it was due to a desire to bring about emigration and colonization. However this may be, the idea disappeared in the 18th Century, and the general feeling in Europe was that population was a good thing, probably because a large population could furnish soldiers for the wars of the 18th century. "The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country," wrote Adam Smith in 1776, "is the increase of the number of its inhabitants." Towards the end of the 18th Century a great wave of optimism swept over Western Europe. The French Revolution had inspired some minds and inflamed others. Most people were hopeful of ever increasing material progress. To add to population was acclaimed even if it meant the making of paupers. In that happy Paradise, Malthus, as Keynes puts it, "disclosed a Devil"—the fear of over-population.

Malthusianism has come to cover a set of doctrines, some of which have very little to do with Malthus. His "principles" have often been discussed by those who have never read his *Essay* in any of its forms.

"Adam Smith has left a book," says Dr. Bonar, "which everyone praises and no one reads; Malthus a book which no one reads and all abuse."

Briefly, his doctrine was that there was a natural tendency of population to increase faster than the means of subsistence, but that the tendency was kept in check by "moral restraint, vice and misery." He attempted to prove the first part of his doctrine by reference to the actual growth of population and to the assumed impossibility of food keeping pace with it.

His checks were diseases, war, plague and "moral restraint." This latter or "prudential check" came about when people followed Punch's advice to those about to marry. His motto may be said to be "fewer and later marriages." The propaganda which is carried on nowadays by advocates of birth-control would have shocked Malthus out of his propriety. The problems of population, then, according to Malthus, could be explained almost in terms of supply and demand. The supply of children was always ready to increase whenever the demand increased. The demand was dependent upon the food supply. If that increased rapidly, population increased rapidly. If that increased slowly, population increased slowly. This is what he meant when he said "Population is ne-

cessarily limited by the means of subsistence," and "generally speaking population always increases where the means of subsistence increases." Malthus' views gave a gloomy tinge to discussions of population in the first half of the 19th Century, but, later, gloom gave away again to optimism, and it was not until the recent war that the Malthusian "Devil" was unchained once more.

There occurred in the 19th Century, in Western Europe, a hitherto unprecedented increase in numbers, but, contrary to Malthus' expectations, subsistence outstripped it. It was calculated in 1910 that if the increase of the past 25 years kept up at the same rate we should, in 1000 years, stand shoulder to shoulder on the earth.<sup>2</sup> Despite this increase, subsistence had more than kept pace. But the rate of increase of population has been getting gradually slower since about 1880. For Great Britain, Professor Bowley has recently calculated that "with the present rates of births, deaths and emigration, the population would increase to 45 or 46 millions about 1941, and then diminish."<sup>3</sup> It is notorious that France has reached a nearly stationary condition of population. Indeed, in all European countries and in countries settled from Europe, there has been a fall in human fertility, "regardless of differences of race, climate and economic conditions."<sup>4</sup> It is undoubtedly true that the main reason for this fall is the deliberate limitation or prevention of families, practised in modern days. It is not Malthus' "moral restraint," but birth-control, due to increased knowledge which has brought about this fall in the birth rate. It means that we must reject Malthus' simple view that children are commodities whose supply reacts to demand, which varies with the amount of food produced, in favour of the view that society, having realised—to some extent through Malthus—what might happen, has discovered and practised the means of preventing its occurrence. Malthus, as we have seen, looked at the problem of population from the point of view of subsistence. Modern economics looks at it rather from the point of view of material welfare. There are other points of view. There is that which accepts a natural increase in population as a good thing in itself. From this point of view large numbers appeal to the pride or vain-glory of those who make broad their census returns and see men as figures walking. Another point of view is defence. Those who believe that "God is on the side of the big battalions," and that war is the recurrent fate of humanity, welcome an increase in population for its own sake. Demands for war and preparations for war lead to a demand for an increase in the supply of cannon fodder. The problem for Economics, however, is whether an increase or decrease in population is likely to make

each one better off materially than before. What we have to consider, too, is not so much *aggregate* material welfare, as *average* material welfare. Economics would say that a nation of two million people, with an average income of £150 per year, was better off materially than a nation of five millions, with an average income of £100 per year. But if anyone says that in the latter case there are three million more souls to be saved and a greater aggregate happiness we cannot say that he is wrong, but only that that view is not economic. Economically speaking, the optimum number of people for any country, or for the world as a whole, will be the number which will produce the greatest average material welfare. For any group average material welfare will depend broadly upon the amount and kind of output per head of goods and services, and the way in which that amount is distributed amongst the members of that group. We may, for purposes of this discussion, ignore questions of distribution, although they are important in the problem of population, and concentrate upon questions of production. The problem of population then becomes one of the relation between the quantity and quality of human beings, and the supply of the material requisites of well-being produced by them. Average material welfare will depend, first, upon the quantity of people in relation to the resources at their disposal—this is for the world as a whole, or for a smaller group. Perhaps it would be more convenient to consider the problem of a group. Upon such factors as the group's original and acquired qualities of mind and body, their knowledge, invention, work, judgment and organisation will depend their output per head. In so far as increase in numbers improves these, so will output tend to improve. On the other hand, the output depends upon the material environment of the group. Since this is more or less fixed there is at any given time a maximum point of return, and on either side of this the return to the efforts of the group will be less.

The point should be clear if we consider the production of food from a limited area of land. Every farmer knows that he cannot go on indefinitely applying more and more labour and capital to a given piece of land, and expect to get increased proportional returns. The point of maximum return, however, is not fixed and may be altered by improvements, inventions, fresh knowledge, which make the material environment of the group capable of giving a greater return. So we have two opposing principles. On the one hand the growth of knowledge, and on the other the tendency for more people to mean less proportional return from the material environment of the group. Some tentative conclusions may be suggested. In most countries, at the present time, the

average material welfare would probably be greater if the population were smaller. At any rate, we may be safe in saying that in most countries, with the possible exception of Australia, average material welfare would not be increased *in consequence* of an increase in population. This is the statics of the problem. Dynamically the question is whether average material welfare is rising faster than if population were growing more slowly. Always bearing in mind the possibility of scientific discovery, such as Professor Soddy describes in his "Science and Life," or Mr. J. B. S. Haldane in "Daedalus," it would appear that in the immediate future most countries would gain in material welfare by a reduction in the growth of population. Human society, at least, in Western Europe, appears to have recognised this and to have taken into its own hands the control over numbers. In so far as this is done, the quantitative problem of population approaches a solution.

But so far we have said little of the *quality* of the people of the group. This is a question which we must not leave to the biologist and the eugenist. Average material welfare will depend upon not only the *quantity* of people in relation to the resources at their disposal, but also upon their *quality*. If they are healthy, capable and intelligent their average material welfare is likely to be greater than if they are unhealthy, incapable and unintelligent, because they will then make the best use of their resources. What kind of people there will be in a group depends upon their heredity and their environment. The modern tendency amongst eugenists is to emphasise the importance of stock as against environment.

A fear commonly expressed is that the decline in the birth rate, which we have noticed above, will be socially bad for a community because the decline is greater amongst the upper classes of society than amongst the lower. If it be true that the less capable, less healthy and less intelligent people are increasing faster than the capable, healthy and intelligent, then, from the economic point of view, average material welfare is likely to decrease. It is true that there is a differential birthrate as between the worse-off and better-off people in most civilised societies. If we arrange people in groups, according to the size of their income, we find generally fewest births per 1000 amongst the richest and most amongst the poorest. It is true that infantile mortality is heavier amongst the poorest, but, even allowing for this, the size of families tends to increase as incomes decrease. Further, it is alleged that there is such freedom nowadays in social stratification that anyone with ability tends to rise in his social class and those without it to fall, so that the upper classes are constantly "skimming off the cream" of the lower, and making them less fertile.

Eugenists believe (and deplore) that ability is concentrated in the upper ranks of society, and they maintain that this is not a mere snobbish belief. But their argument is based upon the assumption that wealth and quality go closely together, that an "inferior stock" may be judged by the test of wealth and social position. They may yet get enough evidence for this, but at present it is far from being proved. That it may be difficult to prove is clear to any economist who has considered inequalities of opportunity and the effects of inherited wealth. Even if there were equality of opportunity, success in acquiring wealth and social position would be no final test of social worth. As to practical eugenic action, we are not likely to get much agreement as to what constitutes "good stock," though we may come nearer to agreement as to "bad stock." These are obviously matters which we cannot leave to the biologist. Once again the practical question is to be decided by a balance of social advantages. On the one hand, there is the obvious economic and social advantage to society in the absence of certain forms of disease and mental deficiency. On the other hand, there may be the definite loss of freedom of opportunity for individual development.

In any case, while waiting for Biology to advance our knowledge of heredity, and while refusing to allow self-constituted judges to choose who shall be the mothers and the fathers of the next generation, we must not overlook environment. "The bluest blood," says a recent writer, "may be poisoned by the diseases bred in slums, and the noblest intellect may be obscured by misuse in early life."<sup>5</sup> Professor Pigou reminds us that "Environments, as well as people, have children." To study heredity and its problems does not, then, absolve us from attempting to deal with the problem of how to improve environment.

---

- (1) Preface to Wright's "Population."
- (2) *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 390-1.
- (3) *Economic Journal*, June, 1924, p. 192.
- (4) Sir W. Beveridge, in *Economica*, March, 1925, p. 15.
- (5) Wright, "Population," p. 163.

## TROELTSCH'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.\*

By Kenneth T. Henderson, M.A. (Melb.), B.Litt. (Oxon).

Troeltsch is the great prophet of the doctrine of Historical Individuality. No standard can be set up for the judgment of person, movement or epoch which does not arise immediately in response to a careful, fully sympathetic effort to penetrate the whole complex activity of the range of life under discussion. The ideal or standard for that person, movement or epoch will emerge as an answer to such effort. It can never be formed by the application of general principles from above to the facts. Each movement in history must be regarded as an Historical Individual. The special significance of that Historical Individual must not be conceived of simply as a contribution to one far-off divine event, or in relation to one all-embracing principle. There may be such, but its unity cannot be so defined as to yield standards of universal application. These units of historical energy have their own tasks, they rise out of the great flow of history, not as links in a sequence, but as spontaneous efforts, having a character all their own. They must be judged always from within. They have standards and ideals which are especially and peculiarly their own by virtue of the fact that they arise out of their own individual and peculiar psychological content, which is itself life's answer to some historical situation. In the case of a period other than our own, or a sphere of life alien from us, it is only by a "prejudiceless sinking into the facts" that such standards and ideals may be recovered. Then, and not till then, we may try these alien movements by our own standards, and judge them as contributions to our own ideals and achievements.

Yet, though Troeltsch denies that the validity of their ends may be universalised, and affirms that differences and even inconsistencies in the values they strive after do not make one right and the other wrong, he will not have us refuse these values and standards of the world to which we actually belong, either as guidance of thought or action. Because a standard of conduct is relative, it is none the less valid.

He believes that for us in nation, state, church, family, or as private individuals there are certain ideals which we must inevitably recognise for ourselves as valid when we meet them at work within their special spheres, and within the limits of the concrete world of action in which they are working, and so far as we make ourselves in spirit members of that world their authority is our answer to its

---

\*Historismus und seine Probleme. (Mohr. Tübingen. 1922).

problems. The fact that we see other civilisations moved by different ideals, and admit that these must not be condemned by our own does not make those foreign ideals equally right for us, nor justify us in refusing the values of our own civilisation for those of other cultures. We are not justified in rejecting the ideals of the West for those of the East, for instance. These latter have been conditioned by climate, and all kinds of factors which have nothing to do with us. The philosophy of life which values individuality, the life of faith and hope, the creed that attaches importance to action and creation—these things are of the West, they are valid for us. Within the lines of our life they are superior to the values of the East. In fact, Troeltsch goes so far as to say that in virtue of these special excellences, the philosophy of the West is absolutely better than that of the East. Any attempt on the part of a Westerner to deny such superiority cannot spring from an attitude morally sincere.

"But the recourse to the East, whose metaphysical depth may well surpass in many respects the European character, is always, as far as we are concerned, a mere trifling and a passing resentment." "Once and for all we are the race which is active, which thinks historically and believes in the significance of Individuality. Our whole nature is thus fulfilled and expressed, and we should surrender and lose ourselves if we were to shut ourselves up within the Orient and its forms of life which have acquired their character from the tropical climate. We may learn from the imperturbability and emotional security of their religious life, and in that respect achieve contact with it. But its undervaluation of the principle of individuality in history, and (its lack of appreciation of) the defined end is for us at all events its weakness, as the care for these things is the source of all the life of the temperate zones." (*Historismus und seine Probleme*, p. 165). "But it is not along the lines of these assertions that we shall find the unity and universality of perception. History and individuality are strong enough to hinder us as far as these are concerned." (*Ibid.*)

The rejection of these Eastern values must come, Troeltsch holds, not on the ground that they contravene any universal principle, but from "an energetic life-will that does not allow itself to be 'thought to bits,' and for its own sake cannot refuse the consciousness of significance in the changes of the historic process, and must interpret this significance by reference to the ethical conviction that it is a task set to it by the moral consciousness to believe in meaning and purpose, and ever to seek its content afresh." (*Ibid.*, p. 165).

This touches the heart of Troeltsch's philosophy. His rejection of all universal theories of ethic does not arise out of an indifferent "broadmindedness." All moral affirmatives for him are primarily creative affirmatives of the will. And it is Historical Individuals—these units of energy and effort which make these affirmations, which have no existence apart from the Individuals by which they are made.

Troeltsch's difficulties about the universality of moral judgment arise out of his historical research. He rejects every monistic interpretation of history. He is profoundly convinced of the futility of judging one period by the standards arrived at by generalising from history at large. Each historical movement rises to deliver judgment upon, and contribute its message to its time, and each of such developments, arising spontaneously out of history, must be allowed a special character of its own.

There are two sets of values we may apply to historical periods or movements. We may judge a period, he thinks, according to its achievement of its own aims and standards, or we may judge its ideals by the ideals of the present. We must be quite clear as to which standard we are using.

But though he objects to any attempts at historical valuations by simple general formulae, and insists on his historical category of Individuality, he does not question the authority of the values asserted by these historical movements. The passage quoted above proceeds:—

"The 'no' (the refusal of the energetic life-will to allow itself to be 'thought to bits') can moreover support and strengthen itself scientifically by the fact that all attempts at a ready naturalistic evolutionary theory which resolves into illusions or reflexes deducible solely from psychological processes the ideals which, in history spontaneously and by force of inner certainty force their way to the surface—all these attempts abdicate when it comes to any really concrete elucidation or deduction."

"The generation of ever-new standards and ideals is a fundamental fact of the spiritual life. These ideals, arising out of the independent and autonomous region of the reason, initiate from the given situation, which, however, they transform and direct by a secret creative energy of the spirit. Only where will and belief grow lame, does this force also hesitate, and simply let itself go in the stream of the present."

"Then thought displays all standards of the Should Be as reflexes of the actual, boasts its own present condition as knowledge free from illusion and possessed of all enlightenment, and re-constructs the past as a romantic age of illusion."

"But the fault indeed lies rather in such a Present, in the misinterpretation of the whole region of reason, of spontaneous, autonomous, and never-resting creation of standards of the 'Ought.' Therefore we cannot and must not reject these standards themselves. But we must reject every feature of them which is inconsistent with the individual character of all true historical creation, and with the particularity of what is produced for contemporary circumstance. (Inconsistent with the historical character of these standards) are their universality, their timelessness, their absoluteness, and their abstraction, their simple identification with reason itself or with the divine character of the order of the world."

"Spontaneity; à priority; self-evidence without timelessness universality and absoluteness; that is the only possible formula. It means at the same time that such standards, as individual constructions must, for each great situation taken in its entirety, be built up and established anew." (Historismus pp. 165-166).

Here again we think that Troeltsch, while emphasising rightly the historical and psychological particularity of each judgment—

the facts which occasion, shape and enlighten it—has overlooked the one essential nature of a moral judgment which—whether in history or the life of the individual—is an attempt to rise above the flow of particular events, and apply to these a plan, in ideal representing universal principles, expressed in terms of those facts transformed. The motives and ideals thus expressing themselves, however dim their comprehension of themselves and mixed with misunderstanding, however limited to the particular range of facts their orientation, yet claim to control and alter those facts by virtue of their claim to represent the nature of this eternal order. The ideal response to the historical situation claims to enshrine a comprehension of it. A concrete historical judgment cannot be transferred from one situation to another in history because the external circumstances which it pre-supposes or in which it is expressed cannot be repeated, much less the intimate psychological atmosphere, the facts of feeling and outlook and stage of knowledge pre-supposed; which are by far the most relevant of the environing facts. But its claim to validity is a claim to represent an eternal order in a special context.

Troeltsch's contention that such individuality should be recognised is useful in that it draws attention to the psychological nature of the judgment of value, considered as an historic fact. We are brought to realise the relevance of the whole concrete setting as constituting the grounds of the judgment's intelligibility, the relevance of such judgment to a special stage of moral development, the intimate connection between an age's characteristic moral judgment and values and its special problems. In reaching a general moral valuation of a period, we must further recognise the operation of the psychological principle of limitation of attention, which seems to warrant us judging the worth of a period by its faithfulness to a few related commanding and outstanding moral ideals related to the problems of the contemporary situation, rather than by the completeness with which its life embraced the full gamut of spiritual values.

Thus we may admit that the historical needs of certain periods—one period's need for unity and tranquillity, and another's hunger for knowledge, and another's for religion—may make certain demands upon the universe, may choose out certain ideals and clothe them with the form of educational policies, political theories, social customs. Further, the constructive work of one period will differ very greatly from that of another, for its particular ends will reflect these special needs. But we would urge that these moral constructions, however characteristic of their period, and different from each other, possess an inner consistency with each other which

seems to represent a core of eternal, absolute and universal significance.

Troeltsch refuses to psychology the right to deny the validity of moral judgments by resolving them merely into an account of their psychological characteristics. He would not deny the usefulness of such knowledge of the process of moral judgment that psychology can give. Increased knowledge of the factors gives to the reason increased control over the factors.

But surely in precisely the same way, and for the same reasons we may refuse to resolve the absoluteness of values into the various forms which they take in response to historic needs. For the increased understanding of these historic factors we must be grateful. History as well as psychology has much to tell us of the processes of moral judgment, adds to our power of testing their moral quality, and of releasing them from historical limitations. But we must refuse to history as to psychology the power to break absolute moral values into occasional and purely individual judgments, and for the same reason—the witness of the judgment itself. Inherent in every moral judgment is a claim to discern the demands of an absolute and eternal order upon a concrete historical situation.

Our standards, Troeltsch thinks, arise in answer to our immediate needs, and are constructed by a critical selection out of the resources of our civilisation. These materials include not only the movements which occupy the public eye, but those which have been pushed into the background. Historical values act dynamically upon one another. Every now and again there comes a time of upheaval. One civilisation comes into contact with another, and is disturbed by its standards as the East by the West, or there arises a need for re-consideration of old values and habits which shakes up the whole content of that civilisation, cleanses it, purifies it, strengthens it against internal dangers such as failures to emphasise what is morally necessary to it, and finally leaves it strengthened against attack. But it has been transformed. The values which rule it, the characteristic aims which absorb it are different.

New aims have emerged, and those are accepted if they are congruent in spirit with what has gone before, if they mark a carrying forward and deepening of that civilisation's life. Thus Christianity accepted much of the thought of late antiquity. There are to some extent the same elements in the new civilisation as in that out of which it has developed.

"In all this, however, these upheavals create not only a new synthesis of the material already there, but in the new synthesis itself there remains hidden something which before was not there at all, which proceeds from the old yet means a new depth of life. It is an *à priori* in the sense that it is a spontaneous creation, in so far as the new really breaks forth out of

inward depths, and only makes itself believed through its inner certainty and the might with which it determines the will. But it is no creation out of nothing, and no construction out of abstract reason, but a rebuilding, and a progressive development, which is at the same time the breathing in of a new soul and a new spirit. The last secret of these processes is the belief in the contemporary reason, which is revealed in them as their dynamic, and in the power of the will to affirm such a belief." (*Historismus*, p. 167).

These times of transformation are the ages of faith, ages in which the human spirit trusts its positive and creative energy. These are the ages of achievement. Their work is distinguished from "purely subjective irruptions and violent cataclysms by its truly historical character in that it arises out of a deep and sympathetic insight into the nature of its heritage, and what it requires for its fulfilment, and secondly by the certainty that it is 'grasping' an inner development of evolution, a 'life movement of the universe or the Godhead. Herein we find the reason why religion plays such a great part in these transformations of civilisation, for this conviction that what is being wrought represents an essential reality which is claiming, through historic need, to be made actual is the 'whole secret of that which the theologians call revelation.' It is an interpenetration of the movements of the Divine Being which no one can construct à priori, or rationalise à posteriori, which on the other hand breaks forth at a given point with a feeling of compelling necessity and clearness. In such a way there grow up in the prophet, the political genius, the style of the artist, the intuition of the great historian, the systematic thought of the true philosopher, the significance of the present and of the future."

"This inner meaning need not always be interpreted in terms of great men. It need not be a Carlyean hero-cult. The yearnings, the thoughts and the critical opinions of the masses are a preliminary necessity for the production of all Heroes." (*Ibid.* p. 168).

Troeltsch believes that the prophetic function of the historian is essential for this process of creating the values of civilisation. His work is the means whereby a civilisation achieves self-consciousness and learns to know itself. Generally he must explain to it how it came into being, but his work does not end there. He must give his own time, historical insight, inner sympathetic understanding of its own aspirations and ideals. This he does in part by showing the present as the living past. All great historical work, with whatever period it deals, must to his mind be dealing with the present also.

Here is applicable his double system of historic values. An age must be judged according to its own standards and ideals, and then as it contributes to the ideals, and ruling motives of the present.

Ranke is Troeltsch's typical prophet-historian. One wonders what Troeltsch would have said of our popular English habit of looking to the novelist for these functions of the historical seer. Perhaps the answer is contained in the approval he gives to Goethe's saying that the man who cannot give an account of himself for three thousand years may live from day to day in darkness and inexperience. The historian must be the prophet, in that it is for him to bring his insight into the past to the interpretation of the present.

But such thinkers must be historians on a large scale. The importance of the research student is that he "devils" for such men.

History then, in the full greatness of its prophetic function, has an essential service to perform for the world to-day, giving to it the power of understanding, judging and developing itself.

"Its knowledge of men and of the world, its fine feeling for the crises and possibilities, its sense of remoteness from the past and from alien civilisations, its discovery of revivifying forces is more important in the modern spiritual household of peoples than the abstract work of all scientific ethics put together, which has significance only so long as it rationalises the ruling energies of life." (Historismus, p. 171).

The meaning of this last statement about the nature of formal ethic will appear later.

The radius of historical judgment is in Troeltsch's view the radius of possible sympathy, which he thinks is from about two to five hundred years. From within this period we can bring ourselves into sufficiently intimate contact with historical movements—for they are still in some measure with us—to accept from them inspiration, warning and advice. When they are thus near we can enter into them sufficiently fully to judge them by their own standards, and to appreciate their movements and ideals as contributions to those which incorporate our own energies.

Such judgments of "alien totalities" must always be carried out by means of this double standard. First we must judge them from the inside by an "immanent critique," judge them by their faithfulness to their own ideals, including in our evidence as to their nature the story of their consequences, for in these another kind of witness as to their inner content will be found. Our second mode of judgment will be in reference to our own standards, and the contribution of their ideals and strivings to the achievements and standards of the present will here have to be considered.

In making such judgments and comparisons, Troeltsch admits that we are compelled to make use of general notions which are formal in character and remote from the world of fact, but for him these general notions are forms which fill themselves up with special and peculiar content derived from the situation which the judging process has been penetrating. General terms such as wisdom, probity, strength, represent different points of view—a series of points of view different throughout the historic process. He ignores, we feel, the inner identity which persists through the diversity of their manifestations.

Only by this process of comparison can we understand either our own period or that of the past, because it alone gives detachment and supplies us with "measuring rods." Moreover we gain from this process more than understanding. "Through it we judge the

foreign world, not only by its own, but also by our standards, and from comparison of these two developments, there arises finally a new movement of its own." (*Ibid.* p. 172).

Alien and past civilisations appear to pass judgments upon us when we allow ourselves to come close to them, and reveal to us values which we have developed very feebly or not at all.

Thus they set up movements within the ideals of the present, in our appreciation of our standards they awaken a sense of incompleteness, and call into being movements of new kinds to fulfil what they revealed as lacking. Such comparisons awaken in us divine discontent by their concrete appeal to the imagination, and by their suggestion that our civilisation can do what others can.

In our judgments we tend to arrange the civilisations we know in a series according to their worth and degree of development. We judge them by what they achieved and what they strove for. But whence come these standards by which we judge? As Troeltsch points out they arise in us with a certain inevitability and spontaneity, when we find ourselves confronted with the facts. The will accepts and affirms them, sometimes it may reject, but even when it rejects it is dealing with a spontaneous judgment that has arisen. This spontaneous activity of judgment cannot, he thinks, be deduced from anything else. Such judgments take the form of perceiving certain unifying values making their way through historical events, and linking one age in its meaning to another. But Troeltsch never allows his thought to approach a point where it might bring comfort to his sworn foes, the "monistic" historians who attempt to interpret the whole course of history by a single formula—without hastily re-asserting his own precious doctrine of Individuality. This he does in the special problem we are studying in two forms, only one of which concerns us at the moment. He assumes that moral judgments as to the comparative value of different civilisations are explicit in the verdict of historians. He points out, first of all, that these connecting value judgments will differ in the work of different historians. But this does not mean that they are purely subjective and eccentric. If the enquiry be thorough and unprejudiced, and sympathy and research both wide and deep, there will be a certain inevitability about each answering judgment, and though distinct they may each possess a certain validity, and be genuine perceptions of some meaning and ideal struggling through the facts. But such value judgments, though, as he believes, they can claim an à priori and objective character cannot claim universality and timelessness but only a validity in relation to the special interests of the historian. These represent the vital points of contact between his civilisation, and the one he is examining. For the sub-

stantiation of their claim to validity, Troeltsch relies on the thoroughness of the research, the intimacy of historic sympathy, the spontaneity with which the judgment rises, and its power of actually interpreting the situation. He bases his final faith in the soundness of these value judgments on no formal ethical theory, but on a metaphysical conviction of a fundamental connection of thought and things in God, a relation "which nevertheless admits of the possibility of error and sins."

His account of the original process out of which the values are formed is simple. It is the Divine Spirit in man, he thinks, which is at work in each age in the creation of its ideals, and in the case of the sincere attempts of the great historian to penetrate with accurate research, deep sympathy, clear vision, into the life of the past, his judgments of value are instances of the "Spirit witnessing with our spirit." The seer discerns the working of the spirit, because of its presence in himself. This is the meaning of the "inner force and compulsion of the understanding" which constitutes for him the ground of the à priority and objectivity of such value judgments in the building up of which he believes that the significance of history consists. To discern these connecting links of meaning is its essential task. Such links are not in his mind causal in the narrow meaning of the term. They are teleological. But his principle of Individuality has here its second safeguard.

These connecting value judgments are not unifying principles running through the universe. They cannot be carried back in an infinite regress. They must not be carried back beyond the limits of our historically intimate sympathy and understanding, which, as we have seen, he considers to be from two to five hundred years. This is somewhat arbitrary. One epoch may be comparatively remote from another in feeling and aspiration though they are close in time, and acting on a feeling of essential kinship we may, by energetic scholarship, bring an era comparatively distant in time close in understanding. What Troeltsch has in mind doubtless is that historical sympathy can only move through a sense of the continuity of movements of thought and life, one period thus finding itself in another. But the time limitation is misleading. There is perhaps more inner connection between the democracy of Athens and the present day than that between the present age and that of the Wars of the Roses. Troeltsch would not of course press for any literal interpretation of his figures, but essential kinship between different eras does not seem to have much to do with time.

Though these judgments are, in his view, the perceptions of the operations of the Divine Spirit in human creative energy, which the judging mind realises with an inevitability due to its essential

kinship, yet he thinks such standards do not reveal the whole nature of such a unity of Spirit. They are successive, and comparatively disconnected intuitions. "God is present to every age in its essential ideals," but present always within the limits of the concrete situation—according to Troeltsch. He thinks that doubtless there is a Divine unity of value and meaning, but it lies deep down out of sight.

Nothing can take away from these value judgments their character as ventures of faith. There is always "something of daring and of doing" about such attempts. Further, they must be continually renewed. The judgments and estimates of a particular crisis must never be transferred to another, but must be constructed afresh. Each crisis is a new combination of circumstances and ideas which must be penetrated anew. It needs the light of new comparisons, a fresh sympathetic verdict arising out of this full interpretation. A verdict upon it can never be attained by the attempt to apply general notions from above, or to measure an historical development in accordance with the situation's conformity or departure from these ideas. A value judgment is not merely one upon the facts. It must include within it the inner apprehension of the facts.

These general ideas are, as we have seen, for Troeltsch only "shells" to be filled by the characteristic tendencies of the life of the Spirit working within the conditions of any epoch. We believe that they are rather more than this. It is true that historical judgments must be continually renewed, yet we believe the fact that certain constant terms suggest themselves as inevitable, when it comes to formulating these verdicts, indicates a greater degree of consistency between the values and ideals of one period and another than Troeltsch is prepared to allow. We think, too that even in the short human historical tradition we can become more fully aware of the inner consistency of the Divine Life so far as we can enter into relation with it than Troeltsch admits. But his work is important, if only for the re-assertion of the neglected principle of historical individuality with its veto on any attempt to judge or understand historical epochs by the facile application of universal principles.

We agree too with his rejection of all attempts to derive historical value judgments from any single formula as to the meaning of history. They must be peculiar to the special intimate inner character of the situation out of which they arise. They are the Spirit witnessing with our spirit as it attempts to understand and realise the significance of the historical problem.

Thus Troeltsch rejects one theory after another, Kantian, Neo-Kantian, Utilitarian, simply because they do not, as a matter of fact, represent the way in which these inevitable value judgments and ideals form themselves and function in history. Of Hegel's philosophy he retains the emphasis on the essential activity of the Spirit, and man's knowledge of it through kinship with it, but he breaks up its unity and continuity, which Hegel stressed, into a series of historic movements the individuality of each of which no general formula can include.

Values are attained when historical movements which have always some unit of energy, whether a person, institution, movement in the narrow sense, reach this Divine Life in their aims. Ideals are the meeting places. But while values are always relative to the Individual in the concrete situation, they are not to be confused therefore with expediencies and utilities. Within their limits they constitute the answer of God.

---

#### NOTES BY THE WAY.

##### No. 11.

###### Logos and Mythos.

In the history of philosophy and poetry, as of religion, Logos and Mythos, two divine children, have never ceased to take part. Sometimes their encounter has been internecine conflict, sometimes intimate embrace. The Plato of the Socratic dialethic and the Plato of the *Symposium* were not of the same mind about them, and when Logos had built up his ideal polity he finally called in Mythos to shadow forth truths which Logos could not reach. On the other side, poetry, beginning in vision and passion, has continually sought the support of reason, and presented itself as the symbolic allegorical venture of truth in a *Divine Comedy*, or a *Faery Queene*; just as religion has habitually sought the support of a divine Logos, a "Theology," for its spontaneous pieties and sacred legends. But sometimes their relation has been less friendly. The medieval mystic who repudiated the pretensions of reason, secure in his inner vision; the great Humanist philosopher, who, with an equal passion for truth, thought to reach it only by a reason cleared and isolated from all the illusions of imagination and sense, were partisans on opposite sides in the same conflict. In the anti-intellectualist movement of the last half-century philosophy herself has derided her own tried tools, and Bergsonian and Crocean intuition and "creative evolution" have been rapturously hailed by the spiritual great-grandchildren of the mystics, poets, and imaginative persons at large, who shared or echoed the anti-Cartesian reaction of two centuries ago. The intervening period had certainly witnessed a chariot-flight of triumphant Logos more magnificent and more all-daring than had been seen since Plato. Yet Hegel's thought not only had room for poetry, but in a sense involved it . . . .

Dr. Bradley has pointed out how in the age of Wordsworth and Coleridge, Hegel and Fichte, English poetry and German philosophy worked with the same sublime faith in the potency of the mind of man. If Wordsworth condemned the "meddling intellect," he could yet declare Imagination to be but another name for "Reason in her most exalted mood." And Goethe said of himself: "My intuition is itself a thinking, and my thinking intuition."

—C. H. Herford, in the *Hibbert Journal*.

## CHANGES IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.\*

*(Le nuove correnti del Cristianesimo)*

By Professor Vittorio Macchioro, Royal University of Naples.

## I.

1. Christianity, in its earliest stage, had neither the desire nor the capacity for "speculation." It was not, nor did it seek to be a philosophy. It was an immediate experience of God. It even denied the value of knowledge, and promised the Kingdom of Heaven to those who became again as little children. It proclaimed that man blessed who believed without having seen, in contrast with the teaching of Socrates, who placed the supreme virtue in knowledge. All the mighty efforts of a Plato or an Aristotle to discover the origin of knowledge, and establish its validity, seemed to come to naught before this claim to build life, not on a theory, but on a person, and to possess truth, not through an idea, but in and through a man. Such ingenuous suppression of reason could not long endure. Speculation became a necessity. The Christ problem itself, as it arose out of primitive Christian experience, required a solution, and this solution could not be found for the second and third generation of Christians, in a direct and personal experience. This was impossible to those who had not known Jesus in the flesh, and who could only interpret the experience of others, who, more fortunate, had been freed from the necessity for speculation by the living presence and inspiration of Jesus himself. It now became necessary for the Christian to think, and to provide some rational account to himself and others, of what Christ was and had been. There thus arose the Christology of the post-apostolic age. Further, out of the need to determine the nature of the Redeemer, there arose a second necessity, namely to determine the nature of the work of salvation. For, on the nature of the Christ depended man's relation to Christ. It thus became necessary for Christianity to investigate the nature and destiny of man. In short, Christianity had to become philosophy.

But while the task of speculation thus became a necessity for Christianity, there was lacking the instrument of speculation, a theory, a doctrine, or school of doctrine. Primitive Christian faith was not a theory, but a concrete reality. Since every Christian felt it as a reality, to reason about it would have seemed alike useless and illogical, hence the speculative incapacity of Christianity in its earliest stage.

2. Christianity, however, had to construct a philosophy for itself if it was not to remain permanently as a state of pure emotion,

or mystic fervour. The Christian faith, when it issued from Judea, came into contact with a mentality accustomed for centuries to philosophic effort, skilled in the task of investigating the value of ideas. From this contact of Christian faith with Greek speculation there came into being a new Christianity, in which the data of immediate experience were arranged within rational schemes. Paul is the most conspicuous example of this new advance, which, in time, issued in Patristics—the teaching of the Fathers. To philosophise became a necessity for the Christian Fathers. To Clement of Alexandria, Greek philosophy is a providential preparation for Christianity. According to Clement there is no essential difference between religion and philosophy, since that which is object of faith must also be object of knowledge. To philosophise and to be a Christian is the same thing. But the Christianity of higher spirits, which is not the same as the naive, unconscious Christianity of the common people, is reached only through Greek philosophy—in particular, the Platonic philosophy. Tertullian, who regarded philosophy as the work of the devil, to be resisted by the barrier of the popular faith, is in comparison with Clement, a man of a bygone age. Clement is the modern man, who scorns the fear which is based on ignorance, and has no respect for the faith which is superior to culture.

Yet Hellenic Christianity did not contain the germ from which a true and proper philosophy of religion might develop. Such a philosophy can arise only from a free investigation by reason of the data of religious experience, whereas, according to the Fathers, the task of philosophy was not to examine the content of the religious consciousness, but to confirm the Christian faith, which is really a particular historical form of the religious consciousness. This was the attitude of Clement and of the other Greek Fathers. They recognised only one true religion, true *a priori*, above and beyond every philosophy. Greek philosophy, which had served as the preparation for the coming of Christianity, must also serve to demonstrate the truth of Christianity.

St. Augustine's thought contains much that may serve as foundation for a true philosophy of religion—the reality of the thinking self, the correspondence between our representations and the divine ideas as ground of the validity of the former, the necessity of actual adhesion to the truth if we are to apprehend the truth—all this contains in germ the possibility of a true philosophy of religion. And yet, for Augustine, as for the other Fathers, the function of philosophy is purely apologetic. The philosopher who warns us that we cannot issue from ourselves, and that truth is to be found within, yet places the criterion for differentiating be-

tween truth and error in a faith historically constituted, that is, in something that is external to man—whereas philosophy seeks to find it in the laws of the human spirit.

3. Scholasticism tended to identify philosophy and religion. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that philosophy, in early stages of scholasticism mainly Platonic, and afterwards mainly Aristotelian, was subordinated to philosophy. Religion furnished philosophy with its data, which were accepted *a priori*, while the freedom of philosophy was strictly limited to the rational justification of the data thus provided. Anselm gave a perfect definition of the spirit of Scholasticism when he said that right order requires us to believe profoundly the Christian faith before we presume to discuss it “rationally,” but that it would be negligence on our part, if after we had been confirmed in the faith, we did not strive to comprehend what we believed. Philosophy thus had, during the Middle Ages, no true life of its own. Its problems were not determined by the needs of the spirit, but by the demands of theology. In fact, all the great problems of Scholasticism arose out of the debates concerning particular Catholic doctrines. The problem of human liberty and its relations with divine providence and justice arose out of the controversy on predestination initiated by Gottschalk. The discussion as to the notions of substance and accident arose out of the controversy as to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, initiated by Berengarius of Tours. The discussion on the concepts, *nature*, *individual*, and *person* were the outcome of disputations by Roscellinus and others as to the nature of the Trinity. Philosophy became the means or instrument for demonstrating the truth of dogmas. It was not, properly speaking, philosophy at all, but rather one side of religion, a particular aspect of Christianity. Scholastic philosophy suffered continually from the immanent contradiction between what it actually was, and what it professed or sought to be. It was troubled and torn between the necessity of rationalising dogma from the philosophical standpoint, and the impossibility of rationalising it from the religious standpoint—a difficulty which gave rise to the absurd theory that what is true in theology can be false in philosophy, and vice versa. We need not be surprised that Scholasticism thus became in substance and in effect the negation of every religious philosophy.

4. Scholasticism was incapable of accomplishing the new task, which now became a necessity, namely, to get behind the contingent historical forms within which the religious consciousness had been moulded; in this particular case, Catholicism, or even Christianity, and examine the nature of the religious consciousness itself. In order to accomplish this it was necessary to transcend the historical

limitations which had kept scholastic speculation hidebound, and to consider directly the facts of spiritual development, in short, to take up once again that process of "internalisation" which Christianity had initiated in face of Paganism, transferring the centre of thought from the world to man, from the external to the internal. Religion could no longer be regarded solely as a tradition consecrated by history, to which philosophy had to adapt itself. It was also a spiritual activity which philosophy had to investigate for its own sake.

This was the task of the men of the Renaissance. The great achievement of the Renaissance was to re-affirm the value of the self, and of the inner life, the "know thyself" which Greek philosophy had previously declared to be man's chief end. The inner life of the individual was regarded as having a reality and a value in itself, independently of the faith which determines it. This new value attached to the manifestations of the individual human spirit was heightened by the pantheistic vision of the universe, which the Renaissance had inherited from Paganism. An Immanent theory of the relation of God to Nature raises the value of the human spirit by making it participate in the divine nature, whereas theories of transcendence, by separating God and man, tend to lower the value of the individual.

The Renaissance, with its profound sense of the reality of the individual, sought God in man, in the inward man, according to the phrase of St. Augustine. For Bruno, God is within us in a deeper sense than we can be said to be present to ourselves. He is the soul of our soul. According to Jacob Boehme, God lives in us, and we live in God, to such an extent that if we are pure and holy we *are* God. The "German Theology" instructs men to know themselves in their own hearts, to seek for happiness in God and in his work, not in a Being who exists outside us, but in a God who lives and has his being within us.

The Renaissance attached immense value to the self as vehicle of the truth, and, therefore, devoted a new attention to the activities of the human spirit. To scholasticism the supreme concern was the salvation of the soul according to certain accepted doctrines. Humanism, on the contrary, sought first of all to know the human spirit and its activities. This explains the indifference of the men of the Renaissance to particular historical forms of religion, and the desire for a religion which would satisfy the needs of the spirit without constraining it to accept a specific tradition. There hence arose a spirit of fraternity and a religious tolerance unknown to mediaeval orthodoxy. Religion was no longer conceived as adherence to a body of doctrines, but in harmony with the current mysti-

cism, as a life of the spirit. The foundations were thus provided for a true religious philosophy. With Descartes, man acquires the consciousness that religion is not something apart or withdrawn from the laws of the spirit, while, at the same time, religion loses its intangibility, and becomes a form or stage of knowledge. In this way Descartes succeeds in, at least, laying the foundations of the philosophy of religion.

5. It is, however, with Spinoza that philosophy of religion really begins, as systematic reflection on the essence of religion. It may even be asserted that in some respects the philosophy of religion has not yet gone beyond the main lines laid down by the Spinozistic philosophy. Spinoza distinguished philosophy from theology, not merely in form, as Thomism had already done, but also in substance. Theology is a practical and moral science, having as its aim to stimulate obedience and piety. The function of philosophy is theoretical, its task being to investigate the relation of things to God. Anticipating the new philosophy of values, Spinoza came to the conclusion that the essence of God is indifferent to faith, meaning thereby that faith is indifferent to the intellectualistic truth or content of the dogmas. According to him, these dogmas cannot be at once "true" and "salutary" to those who accept them, since their efficacy lies not in their theoretical truth, but in their practical force. Tradition and rites are not necessary in order to know the love of God. Spinoza, in fact, opened a path which, on the one hand, led to Deism, and, on the other, to Kant. Without Spinoza's criticism of the positive religions, Hume could not have elaborated his religious philosophy, which postulated a religion, grounded not on authority, but in the nature of man himself. The true successor of Spinoza, however, is Kant, whose philosophy of religion simply carries to its extreme consequences the doctrine of Spinoza. In reducing religion to moralism, Kant ended by regarding it, as Spinoza had done, as a practical activity; in other words, as a complex of values. Yet Kant, in his ethical abstractness, failed where Spinoza had succeeded. He did not grasp, as Spinoza had done, the value of religious experience. He shared the conception peculiar to English Deism, of an absolute stereotyped religion, of which the positive religions were transitory and valueless forms. He failed to comprehend the function of grace, of prayer, of worship, of all, indeed, that was truly essential to the religious life.

6. Hegel follows Kant in so far as he conceived an abstract religion, of which the historical religions are particular forms, but he transcends the narrow Kantian Moralism inasmuch as he regards the positive religions as necessary moments in a spiritual

process, which is gradually revealed in the history of religions. In fact, for Hegel, the philosophy of religion tends to become one with the history of religions: to know the religious fact in its actual process of becoming is at the same time to evaluate it: to discover the laws which govern spirit is to comprehend at the same time the laws which guide history. In this way the various religions assume a certain necessary character, which confers on them, even on so-called "lower" religions, a new dignity. In adopting this point of view, Hegel makes a notable advance in two directions. He transcends the traditional scholastic orthodoxy, which made truth the exclusive possession of one religion, while at the same time, he breaks through the Kantian Moralism which limited religion to a single activity of the spirit. Religion is now seen to permeate all history and all spirit. It becomes a living process, indeed, in a sense the one universal spiritual process.

But if in this way religion as activity of the spirit takes on a new grandeur of aspect, Christianity emerges with a diminished importance. Although Hegel identifies Christianity with the Absolute Religion, thus regarding it as the goal and completion of the entire religious evolution, yet the fact remains that Christianity is brought within the general spiritual process, and ceases to be "exceptional" or "divine," except for those who consider the entire course of history as divine. Hegel's Christianity is magnificent, but not miraculous. The Christianity of Scholasticism was miraculous, even if it was not so magnificent.

With Hegel there is brought to a close the old controversy between philosophy and religion. They are seen to be identical in substance, though differing in form. They are now regarded as diverse visions of a truth which is one and single, expressed in terms of reason by philosophy, through the medium of imagination and intuition by religion.

The individual, however, seems to lose his value, when placed in the midst of the immense spiritual process which stretches across history. Hegel, from the heights of his general survey, fails to enter the penetralia of the individual spirit. Particular experiences escape his ken. His distinction between religion and philosophy, according to which religion, while identical in content with philosophy, functions only through images and symbols, remained only a theoretical distinction, and did not, as it might have done, serve as the starting point for a fruitful investigation into individual religious life.

With Kant and Hegel religious philosophising touched the last heights of abstract analysis and speculation. A reaction was required to bring the philosophic mind once more into contact with

the active life of the spirit, and reactions were not lacking. Herder reacted in the name of a full and real religious life, founded on the conception of God as immanent spirit. Lessing reacted on behalf of a faith grounded on feeling, independent of all argumentation. Hamann, and later, Novalis, as follower of Fichte, pleaded for a real unity of the spirit, while Jacobi appealed to the fact of the "immediacy" of religious experience and knowledge. But it was Fichte, above all others, who became the signal of reaction. Deserting Kantianism, with its doctrine of an impossible "thing-in-itself," he betook himself to an absolute idealism, in which all is God, and nothing exists apart from God. Life and the universe appear to him as a morality or moral will in action, to which man must adhere if he is truly and really to live. Fichte thus grasps what Kant had failed to apprehend—that religion is not an ethics so much as a metaphysic, an interpretation of the world, an abundant fullness of living, a unification of the spirit. Religion is not a succession of actions, but light, the only true light which inspires and guides life in all its forms. The right action is not something imposed from without, it is self-revealing: it is not sacrifice, nor suffering, nor failure—but the full and free expression of that activity which constitutes the blessed life of the spirit.

7. Fichte's doctrine of religion was the result of a long speculative travail of the spirit. Schleiermacher reached his doctrine by considering the facts of daily experience. He strives to cut himself loose from all abstractions. Religion is a life which is lived, a real event of the spirit, and to live religiously implies a fullness and potency of feeling which can be realised only through the free activity of the spirit, not reached by arid paths of dogmatic doctrine. Dogmas have consequently for Schleiermacher only a symbolic value, and are the outcome of the necessity of expressing and communicating that inner life of the spirit of which the historical religions are so many differentiations. The historical religions are distinguishable from each other, not so much through determinate differences of content, as through specific differences in the tone or colour of religious feeling. And the same is true of all individual expressions of the religious consciousness. Having thus eliminated from religion all doctrinal and rational constituent elements, it becomes impossible to reduce to unity or uniformity the diverse expressions of the religious consciousness. On last analysis, we are left with as many religions as there are individuals. The philosophy of religions seems to issue finally in the triumph of individualism and subjectivism.

## II.

1. In this process of religious thought, as it passed through four essential moments or stages, represented by Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, we can trace the gradual, and perhaps unconscious formation of the new theory of religion as synthesis of values. When Spinoza attributes to theology a practical function, and divorces the efficacy of dogmas from their truth-content, when Kant gives religion a strictly ethical function, when Hegel gives it a representative function, when Schleiermacher reduces it to feeling —we can see in all this the slow formation of a theory of values, of a doctrine which places the essential element of religion, not in concepts, but in feeling and sentiment, not in knowledge, but in experience. It is the antipodes of scholastic philosophy, for which the centre and essence of religion were to be found in knowledge. In the Middle Ages the supreme religious end was to know God. In our modern epoch, the supreme end is to live God. It seems a natural outcome of this evolution of thought when Hermann declares that religion need have no metaphysical content. It does not matter to the religious life, according to Hermann, what the metaphysical content may be, dogmatic, materialistic, idealistic, or pantheistic, since religion should concern itself only with the moral ideal. Ritschl also rejects metaphysic, and views Christianity as a system of values, historically grounded, whose validity depends not on theoretical considerations, but on experience. Kaf-tan is of opinion that the aim of religion is to realise, not ethical ideals, but "goods," and that its basis is eudaimonistic. Biederman defines religion as a relation to Universal Being, not of the general thinking self, but of the individual practical self, that is to say, as a practical consciousness of the absolute. Zeller places the essence of religion in the need of goods which we do not possess. Bender finds the final end of every religion in the liberation of man from all impediments, and in the attainment of happiness. Sabatier asserts that faith is the practical solution of the conflict between spirit and nature, and that all religious judgments are judgments of value. King pronounces religion to be a valuational attitude in face of determinate values, and Gиргенсон places the content of religion in the values of the practical reason. Finally, Höffding regards religion as conservation of values.

All modern religious philosophy is thus a philosophy of values; or, in other terms, the great philosophic conquest initiated by the Reformation has been accomplished, the separation of philosophy from religion. Religion is no longer a lower, inadequate, or obscure form of knowledge as contrasted with a higher stage of full and complete knowledge, supposed to be attainable by the philo-

sophic consciousness, but is a specific activity of the human spirit, not to be identified psychologically with the activity of cognition.

This change of attitude really is equivalent to a great revolution, for, from the religious point of view, the theory of religion as "value" or as "experience," signifies nothing less than a *disvaluation* of theology. Theology possessed a value and dignity of its own so long as a cognitive function was attributed to religion.

Theology meant then neither more nor less than knowledge of God. The metaphysical world could be known by means of theology, just as the physical world could be known by means of physics. The metaphysical world was as objective, concrete, real as the physical world. Dogmas in the one sphere were comparable to physical laws in the other sphere. The Trinity was a mystery, undoubtedly, but it was a mathematical mystery. Transubstantiation also was a mystery, but it was a chemical mystery. All religion thus became, on last analysis, *nature*, that is a complex of notions, realistic and objective. The origin of this Realism is to be found in Greek speculation. Greek philosophy began to influence the interpretation of Christian experience, when Christianity left Judea and entered the great Hellenic world. It brought to the interpretation of the new religion, that realism, that reduction of spirit to nature, that need of objectifying inner facts which was characteristic of Greek mentality. Theology as an "objective" science, and religion as a form of cognition, were the products of this marriage of Christian faith and Greek realism. Now the conception of religion as a synthesis of values, or as experience, implies the reduction of dogmas to symbols. But this reduction means that theology loses completely its former value. It ceases to be a complex of cognitions, having value as knowledge, and becomes a collection of representations having value as symbols. In a word, theology has become mythology. This is the profoundly significant result to which the long process we have traced, finally leads. Theology retains its name, but really it has become mythology. And, having become mythology, it ceases to have the same importance for the religious consciousness which it had of old. It may continue to represent imperfectly the religious consciousness, but it no longer determines it.

3. From this reduction of theology to mythology arises what may seem to some a great danger, to others a great hope—nothing less than the possible re-integration of Christianity. The history of Christianity has been a long process of disintegration. From the Apostolic Age downwards, it has shown a dispersive tendency, a tendency to divide and dissolve into churches, sects, and heresies. This centrifugal tendency is remarkable in a religion which

had its centre in a person, and ought, therefore, to present the greatest unity. But the centralising force of the gospel of Jesus had to meet another force—Greek realism, with its demand for religious *knowledge*. What man believes is true: the forms in which he arranges and co-ordinates his experiences are true, that is, are so many pieces of knowledge. At once the necessity arises of opposing knowledge to knowledge, truth to alleged truth. For, in matters of knowledge, one cannot be tolerant. If my piece of knowledge is true, another assertion different from mine cannot be equally true. Two statements in reference to natural objects or events cannot be equally true: a body cannot at the same time be white and black, or heavy and light, but must be either one or the other. Scientific knowledge thus leads necessarily to disjunction, “either—or.” When spirit is reduced, as we have said, to nature, and experience to knowledge, and the believer is convinced that he possesses the only true knowledge of God, the pathway is opened for the entrance of schism, intolerance, persecution. All the sad and saddening history of Christian dissidence and disintegration takes its rise from the conception of the cognitional function and value of theology.

But, with the reduction of theology to mythology, the reintegration of Christian unity becomes possible. The conceptual truths which divide men will give way to the vital experiences which unite them. For the dogma-concept which is the source of disharmony will be substituted the dogma-symbol which allows harmony in difference.

This is the great result of the philosophical development which, beginning with Spinoza, culminates in the Christian thought of the present day. The spiritual unity hitherto impossible, has become possible, thanks to the gradual transition from theology to mythology. And, in fact, no previous age, has ever shown the same intensive and extensive capacity for bringing about the reintegration of Christian unity. In no epoch have there ever been experiments so numerous and so varied in Christian unification.

These experiments are made in two different directions—institutional and spiritual—a unification of churches and a unification of men. Much has already been accomplished in the first direction, and more is being attempted—unification of Methodist and Baptist churches in the United States, unification of churches in Canada and Australia, proposals for the unification of the Anglican or Russian church with the Roman Catholic church. All these attempts represent a great step onwards in the progress towards unity. But it is obvious that such unity will not be possible so long

as one church—the Roman Catholic church—holds fast to theology as a system of cognitional truths. On last analysis, however, the attempt at an institutional re-integration of Christianity fails to transcend the conception of theology as a system of cognitional truths, since the aim is to unify the various theological systems in one theology, which will still have the character and content of cognitional truth. But in such a case the result would not be essentially different from the cognitional theology of the apostolic age, which led fatally to disintegration. A reintegration which would consist merely in substituting for a number of separate churches, a single church based on similar dogmatic foundations could not possibly be successful.

A better fortune will attend attempts at a spiritual reintegration. If theologies are regarded as systems of symbols or symbolised truths, the historical diversity of these symbols will be recognised and transcended in the spiritual unity of the experience which they contained or represented. The world-wide movement towards a spiritual reintegration of Christianity is truly immense in its scope. Under various names and with varying programmes, according to differences of place and people, it has one and the same end in view—Christian unity in experience. It is unnecessary to enumerate such attempts by individuals and societies, from the Young Republic of Marc Saugnier, to Young Men's Christian Associations and Christian Liberal and "super-confessional" associations founded at Berlin, Leyden, Stockholm, and elsewhere: all these, and other movements really form part of one movement, the spiritual reintegration of Christianity.

A general movement so intense and profound does not come into being without equally profound causes. Those causes are to be found in the development of philosophic thought which we have traced, the full effects of which are only now becoming apparent. In fact, it is only in our own age that Christian reintegration is presenting itself as possible. In any other age, it would have been impossible. No previous epoch has contained varied expressions of Christian thought comparable to those represented (to mention only a few instances) by the transcendentalism of Emerson, the evangelical Catholicism of Söderblom, the pure Christianity of Tolstoi, the unitarian Christianity of Naville, the universalistic

---

\*[The *Christian World* correspondent thus describes the great Conference held recently at Stockholm: "Thirty-seven nationalities mingled in a Christian fellowship which has been real and delightful. East and West disproved Kipling's assertion that never the twain shall meet. Japanese and Chinese, American and Australian, Greek and Scot, German and French, English and Bulgarian, whites and browns, and blacks and yellows, have met in amity with a common purpose, forgetting all racial distinctions in an underlying Christian unity, and differing in nought save opinion."—Editor.]

Christianity of von Hügel, all of these containing spiritual teaching in which cognitional theology is transcended, and attempts made to reintegrate Christian unity on the basis of experience. During the Middle Ages Catholicism had been negative and exclusive, conceiving and asserting itself as negation of other forms of religion. After the Reformation, Catholicism and Protestantism stood face to face, each denying the validity of the other, in the same attitude which Catholicism had adopted during the Middle Ages towards other religions. Christianity had produced more discord than concord. The world has had to wait till our own age for the unifying function of Christianity to be truly understood. We believe, therefore, that the present age and the immediate future represent a great epoch in the history of Christianity, the third epoch in succession to those of Protestantism and Catholicism, the epoch in which the heritage from Pagan speculative thought will be definitely transcended, the epoch of the unification of Christianity, not in a church, but in God.

---

#### NOTES AND NEWS.

The Sixth of the series of International Congresses of Philosophy (inaugurated at Paris in 1900 for the advancement of philosophy and the promotion of intercourse among philosophical scholars) will be held in the United States, Sept. 13-17, 1926, at Harvard University. The recognised languages will be English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Membership in the Congress will include Active Members (fee \$5.00) and Associate Members (fee \$2.50). The Sessions of the Congress will be arranged under four divisions, Metaphysics, Theory of Knowledge, Logic, and Scientific Method; Theory of Values; History of Philosophy. One General Session under each division will be held, with papers by specially invited speakers. Sectional meetings will also be held under each division. No papers will be accepted, unless they are to be presented by their authors in person. Adhesions, membership fees, and papers for the Sectional Sessions may be sent to Professor John J. Coss, Corresponding Secretary, 531 West 116th Street, New York City

## GREAT THINKERS II—HENRI BERGSON

By Professor J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.  
University of Melbourne.

### I.

MONSIEUR BERGSON has reached the age when professors retire from their chairs, and, if they are of international repute, usually go on a lecture tour either to America or Australia. Bergson has already been to the States, but not to Australia. It is likely that he will be asked to visit Australia in the near future. The moment is opportune, therefore, to take a brief survey of the man and his work.

Short in stature, powerful in intellect, extremely courteous in manner, genial in conversation and incisive in debate, Henri Bergson has charmed Paris by his lectures and the world by his books.

Born in Paris, in a house close to the Opera, in the year that Darwin published his "Origin of Species" (1859) the young Bergson was taken to London. His family belong to that race which is so unique in the world's history, that intellectually aggressive people that has produced Moses, Amos, Jesus, Spinoza, Heine, Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim, Einstein—the Jews. Bergson's own family is mainly Polish, but there is Irish blood on his mother's side. Young Bergson learned English as a second native tongue. Returning to France he entered upon courses at the *Lycées*, and, prior to entering the University, became a naturalised citizen of France (then under the Second Empire). This step is necessary for all who wish to take up permanent teaching posts in that country.

The *Lycées* have had a profound influence on the intellectual life of France. Their curriculum contains, in its final year, philosophy. In France philosophy is not hidden away in the academic cloisters, it is taught in the schools. This partly accounts for the remarkable familiarity with philosophical ideas possessed by Frenchmen. It has given them a higher *average* of philosophical education than any other nation. The familiarity and accuracy with which both officers and men of the French Army could discuss, e.g. Descartes and his work, was remarkable and to be explained mainly by the work of the *lycées*.

Henri Bergson passed several years at the *Lycée Fontaine* (now the *Lycée Condorcet*) and proved himself brilliant at science, classics, and especially mathematics.\* He hesitated between work in mathematics and in philosophy. He chose the latter and it would be idle to surmise what might have happened had he taken the other course. In view of his admiration for Poincaré and in view

---

\* His first published work was a mathematical article written when he was nineteen. At twenty-five he issued his *Lucretius* showing his ability in classical scholarship.

of his latest book, "*Durée et Simultanéité, d'après la théorie d'Einstein*, Bergson might have outdistanced Poincaré and given us a French Theory of Relativity, to which Poincaré himself nearly approached. However, to leave fancy for fact, Bergson entered the Ecole Normale Supérieure at nineteen and took the Licence and Agregation in Philosophy. From there he went to teach at the "automobile town" of Clermont Ferrand and began to formulate his own philosophy, publishing (1889) his theses for the Doctorate of Letters, one Latin (on Aristotle) and one French, entitled *Essai sur les Données immédiates de la conscience*, which is better described by its English title, *Time and Free-Will*. This volume was dedicated to Lachelier who, in conjunction with Ravaïsson, had a profound influence on the rising generation of young French thinkers.\*

After the publication of his theses and the issue of a critical text of Lucretius, Bergson returned to the capital and in 1896 issued *Matière et Mémoire*, the fruit of much thought and research. In 1900 he was appointed *maitre de conférence* at his alma mater, the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and finally in 1900 was invited to the Chair of Ancient Philosophy at the *Collège de France*. The élite of Paris crowded to his lectures, and his theatre was filled to overflowing. To be one of the forty-three professors of this intellectual citadel was a high honour and recognition by his countrymen, as was also his election later to the Institute as a member of two Academies, the Académie de Sciences morales et politiques, and the great collection of the Forty Immortals, the Académie Française.

He issued his charming little book on Laughter, *Le Rire, essai sur le Comique et la Vie*, and his *Introduction à la Métaphysique* appeared as an article dealing with his view of intuition as a kind of intellectual sympathy.†

On the death of the sociologist, Tarde, Bergson accepted the Chair of Modern Philosophy. In 1907 he made perhaps his greatest contribution to thought in *l'Evolution Créatrice*, which was widely bought (21 editions were sold out by 1918), deeply studied and translated into many tongues, and made popular in England by the enthusiasm of the American thinker, William James, in his English lectures.‡

\*Lachelier's "*Introduction*" is a brilliant little book. Ravaïsson issued a Philosophical Manifesto in 1867, his "Rapport." Boutroux emphasised the problems of freedom and of science. The link of a common interest in the Time problem is seen in Bergson's review of Guyau's *Idée du Temps*. On the work of these men and others who have been, outside their country, unduly overshadowed by the enormous popularity of Bergson (see the writer's volume *Modern French Philosophy*).

†In book form in English, not in French.

‡William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, chap. v. and vi.

Bergson himself was invited to England and at Oxford delivered two lectures which are the best introduction to, and summary of, his whole thought *La Perception du Changement*. These are unfortunately not as well known as they should be, and reveal the power of clear, concise exposition so characteristic of the French intellectuals generally. At Birmingham he lectured on *Life and Consciousness*, at London on *The Nature of the Soul*, and on *Fantômes des vivants et Recherche psychique*. He was President of the Society for Psychical Research. Just prior to the war he gave the Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh on *The Problem of Personality*. Visiting the United States he lectured on *Spiritualité et Liberté* and *La méthode de philosophie*. He was again at Oxford at the Congress in 1920 and spoke on *Prévision et Nouveauté*.

Bergson was not, however, a prophet who was without honour in his own country. His election to the Academy proves this, but more remarkable was the intense interest in his thought taken by philosophical minds, and secondly by poets, theologians and social revolutionaries. His books had an influence on contemporary literary men (especially Péguy\* and Claudel). The Church banned his books and placed him on the "Index." But Georges Sorel, the Syndicalist, author of "*Reflections on Violence*," declared that the "élan ouvrier" is brother to the "élan vital" and that the same note was being sounded by the professor of philosophy at the College de France and by the trumpet of social revolution at socialist (or rather syndicalist) headquarters. Sorel, in seeking to ally Bergson with Bolshevism or Revolutionary Syndicalism, overlooked the fact that while the philosopher believes firmly in the reality of change, he does not consider that all social changes are therefore good.

The war turned attention from these arguments (only temporarily), and Bergson went to America with Viviani, and also to Spain on diplomatic missions. He published his little book on *La Signification de la Guerre*, in which he patriotically conceived the conflict as one of the esprit of the French against the mechanism of the Germans.

Since the war Bergson has not ceased his "intellectual effort." Under the title of *L'Energie Spirituelle*, he has gathered together some of his articles out of print, and he is occupied with another volume of collections, to contain (inter alia) *The Perception of Change*, and the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, together with some new matter on the precise nature of Intuition.

In 1920 he quitted the active duties of his Chair at the College de France in favour of M. Le Roy,† and has been occupied since

---

\*See on this *Some Modern French Thinkers*, by Miss Turquet-Milne.

†Le Roy published "Une philosophie Nouvelle," in 1912.

with a work on *Human Society*, which will deal primarily with sociology but also with ethics and religion. It need hardly be said that this volume is awaited with great interest. From time to time he has been absent from Paris at his chalet in Switzerland, near Mont Blanc and has been detained at Geneva (until recently) as Chairman of the League of Nations Committee on International Intellectual Co-operation. Demands of health will require him in future to sojourn away from the capital, but one cannot but regret the quite false rumours spread in the French and English press about his health. (The French are prone to this sort of thing. A long obituary notice of the death of Boutroux appeared about the time of the Armistice, but in 1920 and 1921 the present writer had long conversations with him at his home in the "Fondation Thiers.")

The most important recent work of Bergson has not, however, received the attention it deserves. He laid aside for a time in 1920, his preoccupation with Sociology for a critical study of J. Einstein's work in order to examine the relationship between the theory of Relativity and his own doctrines on Time which date from 1889. The fruit of these labours was a remarkable little volume, issued in 1922 (and now in several subsequent revised editions) "*Durée et Simultanéité à propos de la théorie d'Einstein*". This book and its ideas may serve as a point of departure from this biographical survey to enter on a very brief examination of the main ideas in the Bergsonian philosophy.

## II.

Bergson's philosophy is not offered to us as a system, but centres round certain ideas. The French have no great constructive, ambitious systems like those of Spinoza, Kant or Hegel. Bergson makes no pretence of offering a complete system as the Germans have done. He is content to leave intellectual Big Berthas to them and to proceed to an attack on certain problems in the French manner with smaller but more efficient "seventy-fives." On the other hand he will go down to posterity with a great reputation for brilliant phychological analysis rather than as a philosopher on the plane of Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel, unless his forthcoming work gets on to the high plane on which these thinkers moved.

The root ideas and problems of the Bergsonian philosophy (around which an enormous mass of expository and critical literature has grown up in France, Germany, England, Italy, and America\*) are topics of such eternal interest as Change, Time, Freedom, Memory, Intuition, and Evolution.

---

\*As shown by the bibliography in the writer's little volume, "*Bergson and His Philosophy*," (London, Methuen). The most important of these works in the English tongue are those of Cunningham, Lindsay, Weldon Carr, McKellar Stewart, Rostrevor.

Bergson considers that ordinary Time, the time measured by clocks and used for our rendezvous of pleasure or business is a false Time. It is, he thinks, really Space and not Time at all, only Time spatialised (mathématisé à l'outrance), real time is, for him, *La Durée*, the time of the mind, *le Temps percu et vécu*, actually perceived, experienced, lived by us.

In the Theory of Relativity there arise some paradoxes in regard to the question of time. Einstein insists that there is not a single Time for events nor an absolute simultaneity. There exist *multiple* times. Events which for an observer on the earth are contemporary or simultaneous are not contemporary or simultaneous for an observer in another planet. Also we are asked to accept the doctrine that all observation of events at a distance is bound up with light signals and depends on the speed of light which is invariable. Further there is no speed in the universe greater than that of light, according to Einstein. If one could imagine a traveller in a projectile like the man in Jules Verne, in Flammarion's "*Lumen*," or in Langevin's famous hypothesis, travelling faster than light, this gentleman would be able to see events backwards, i.e., the normal time-order would be, for him, reversed. As Nordmann, the Paris astronomer puts it, such a traveller could see the battle of the Marne in a unique manner, like the man in H. G. Wells' *Time Machine*. He would see the soldiers lying dead, arising, fighting, then going to Paris in Gallieni's taxi cabs (*backwards*),—a mode of motion similar to that pictured in the now well-known limerick—

There was a young lady of Bright  
Whose speed was faster than light  
She eloped one day  
In a relative way  
And returned on the previous night.

(As Dr. Johnson said of the English when they philosophise "cheerfulness will keep breaking in").

In his book on *Durée et Simultanéité*, Bergson has denounced the multiple times of the theory of relativity and has endeavoured to show that they rest on a half-baked and half-applied interpretation of relativity. For Bergson no time is real save *La Durée* the time of our minds, not that of clocks. His psychological analysis of time experience is a penetrating one but the *Durée* of Bergson is not (in the writer's opinion) really Time. It is too subjective. Time involves succession and duration. *La Durée* is not real time, but an introspection of the mind examining its experience of enjoying itself. Undoubtedly it is an experience. Lovers and mystics when they are absorbed in the object of their contemplation become

oblivious of time, but they cannot dispense with clock-time for their rendezvous. *La Durée* is the soul's experience of *itself*, not of *Time*.

Further I also disagree with the fundamental Bergsonian thesis—"All is change and change is all." He has forgotten or neglected the permanence in our experience and has led us into a world barren and contingent which is making nowhere. He rejects teleology because he acclaims freedom. But freedom is not caprice, and in our own lives we choose from time to time (it is true), but we determine our choices by ideas and ideals and by ourselves as personalities valuing these ideas and ideals. He has minimised the effect of ideas and ideals on the life of mankind, and on personal character and action. He has not admitted with his great French critic, Alfred Fouillée, that ideas are forces in the individual and collective life of humanity. Thus he has not climbed the heights of Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant. More fairly, perhaps, one might say he has never brought his discussion on to this plane and so his doctrine of freedom is inadequate and partly irrational.

It is true that we all are generally creatures of habit. In Bergson's opinion habit is the victory of matter over the spontaneity of spirit. But spontaneity in itself undirected by conceptions of end or value is only another form of caprice, and we must formulate a conception of freedom which does not neglect the conceptions of value, obligation and end in the life and progress of humanity. For Bergson freedom is due to the original impetus, but freedom for man is not an original endowment. Far from this, it is an achievement, and that a difficult but progressive one. Man is fundamentally instinctive, and may be the capricious slave of these impulses. Freedom cannot be due merely to them, for it implies development beyond the mere sphere of vital impulses to a plane of moral obligation. This problem Bergson has never touched.

Psychologically, Bergson has done valuable work in his analysis of memory. He draws a distinction between automatic memorising and "pure" memory. Never, he affirms, does the mind really forget anything absolutely beyond recall. We may fail to recall our past experience at some particular moment, but we can never be sure that it is gone for ever. In dreams and in moments of stress and danger our total past may be revived. In this connection we should like to say that the dreams of the normal person are largely due to past memories and this point is in danger of being overlooked by the insistence on sex which is a misguided obsession of the Freudians. Bergson in his charming little book on Dreams, simply pays no attention to Freud at all. In the *normal* individual, fears and wishes moderately, and past memories intensely, determine the character of dreams.

Bergson regards memory as the real plane of spirit, and relates it to the spiritual or idealist interpretation of the Universe. Also in the sphere of psychic research it is an important factor. Bergson is deeply interested in such research and the present writer recalls with pleasure a long conversation with him on the subject of that remarkable and anonymous book, *An Adventure* (Macmillan), which should be read by all interested in psychic phenomena. This book contains an account of a visit to Versailles by two ladies who seem to have experienced, heard, and seen what Marie Antoinette heard and saw there just before her death. The case is singularly interesting in view of the great geographical alterations at Versailles since that date, which were unknown to the ladies.

Bergson has been largely instrumental in breaking down the dominant faith of a now past generation in the mechanistic and materialistic view of the universe. What should we know now about the nature of mind, he suggests, if the labours of the last three hundred years had been devoted to the phenomena of mind instead of to the phenomena of the physical universe. In his insistence on Mind and its primacy, Bergson ranks with the Idealists. He realises, however, that personality is allied to matter, that conscious life is allied to cerebral activity. Nevertheless, he emphatically rejects "psycho-physical parallelism" as a final explanation and is even sufficiently daring to affirm that telepathy may be a fact, and the life of the mind wider than that of the brain which it uses as its instrument. This is a complete reversal of the view point so tersely expressed by Cabanis in his statement that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile."

Another idea in Bergsonism is the insistence upon the limits of the intellect and the glories of Intuition. In this connection Bergson's own language has been most unfortunate and contradictory. In his *Introduction to Metaphysics* he speaks of "the reversal of all our habits and thought," and asserts that intellect misleads us. This is an extremely regrettable assertion. It is truer to say that possibly the intellect is *inadequate* to express all our feelings, but to suggest utter antagonism between intellect and intuition, as he does, is to land us in irrational mysticism or to force us into acceptance of a singularly narrow view of intellect as merely the power to measure solid bodies and add up columns of £.s.d. Such a conception is not that of human reason as taken by the great thinkers, nor is it true to experience. Bergson here needs to take his stand on a broader conception of human reason and to recognise its transition from the purely analytic to the synthetic grasp of life. Intellect

narrowly surveyed is purely analytic, intuition he claims, is *intellectual* (mark the word!) *sympathy*, and is synthetic in character. He errs in trying to drive a wedge between these two activities of the mind but he gives up this mood in his Huxley Lecture on *Life and Consciousness*. There he admits the necessity of intellectual work as a prologue to intuitions and while recognising the value of science sees rightly that man cannot live by that kind of dry bread alone. "We reach reality in the profoundest meaning of that word by a combined and progressive development of science and philosophy." This admission in *Creative Evolution* is quite contrary to his remarks in the earlier book. To say that science is inadequate is correct, to say it is non-sensical and misleading is unpardonable, and we can never imagine Boutroux, who did so much to interpret science to philosophers and philosophy to the scientists, and who was in some respects a more "ultimate" thinker than Bergson, ever making such statements as those on Intuition in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Intuition, if intelligible or valuable, is reason in its broadest synthetic activity of appreciation and enjoyment. Philosophy in this sense and at this height, gives us, as Bergson rightly affirms, a joy which "Science" can never provide, because "Science" consists of piece-meal sciences valuable and necessary, but not final.

We noted that Bergson was born in the year Darwin published his great work. In 1907 Bergson's own contribution to the doctrines of evolution was made. He there traced with bewitching charm the evolution of life from early times (beginning with an initial super-consciousness) through the physical world, to life in its forms of torpor (in plants), instincts (in animals), intelligence and intuition (in man). He succeeds in showing how much "Evolution" describes and how little it *explains*. His criticism of Darwinian phrases like adaptation to environment is valuable. "That adaptation to environment is the necessary condition of Evolution we do not question for a moment. It is quite evident that a species would disappear should it fail to bend to the conditions of existence which are imposed on it. But it is one thing to recognise that outer circumstances are forces Evolution must reckon with, another to claim that they are the directing causes of Evolution."\* The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movement of Evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still less the movement itself."† The evolution of life cannot be explained as merely a series of adaptations; a mechanistic view is inadequate to explain the facts, equally inadequate (Bergson claims) is a finalist or teleological conception.

\**Creative Evolution*, p. 107 (French text, p. 111), F. 11).

†*Ibid*, p. 108 (F.p. 112).

His position is here peculiar, and seems a curious blend of idealism and agnostic naturalism. He begins with mind, which creates matter, and yet rejects any idea of purpose. He, rather inconsistently with this, looks on Evolution as a way to personality, its highest manifestation. Evolution is the push of an *élan vital*, but this push aims only at self-manifestation. Bergson never reaches the sphere of values, or discusses progress in relation to these. This he intends to do in his forthcoming sociological and ethical treatise. Meanwhile we emphasise the importance of this view of progress. It is not assured, it is possible only if we will it and if we side with the initiative of the spirit rather than the conservatism and automatism of matter. There are grave difficulties in any theory of evolution, such as the explanations of matter, life, mind, and conscience. Each of these levels shows something new or unforeseeable.\* Evolution is thus really creative. There are special difficulties about Bergson's doctrine of the origin of matter and his theory of spirit lessening in tension and so giving rise to matter, yet later having to fight against that very matter it has fashioned. This is an eternal problem and Bergson we must remember does not profess to give us a full system of philosophy. He believes that science, history, philosophy and sociology can only advance by intellectual co-operation. He modestly considers his own share that of a digger at the roots clearing the ground and getting rid of the stumps of an outworn materialistic philosophy which, like a cancer, mars the development of our intellectual and spiritual life. He has not yet given to the world his thoughts on sociological, ethical and religious problems which appear to be a necessary supplement to his published work.

He believes in the possibility of intellectual, social and moral progress provided humanity will work for it. It will not be an evolution devoid of decisions and choices or free from terrible setbacks, periods of retrogression but the *élan vital* of the Universe is going on and he visualises in his *Creative Evolution* the animal taking its stand on the plant, man bestriding animality and the whole of humanity in space and time as one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, "perhaps even death."

---

\*A valuable popular exposition of this is given in Hoernlé's "Matter, Life, Mind, and God."

While we disagree with his doctrines of Change, of Time, and of Intuition and consider his doctrine of Freedom inadequate, and lament his neglect of the philosophy of values, especially in relation to the life-conflict *between instinct and intellect* in man, nevertheless we pay homage to him as (within the limits he has set himself) one of the most penetrating thinkers of our day, to whom we ourselves owe a personal debt which can never be adequately acknowledged, and a privileged inspiration never to be forgotten. While not giving us a complete philosophy few men have ever done more for philosophical *problems* than Bergson. He has restricted himself to a few, but these are, as he recognises, fundamental. We hope and trust that he will be able to conclude the great work on which he is engaged and if possible to visit Australia.

---

#### NOTES BY THE WAY.

##### No. 12.

###### Can Religion be Taught?

If religion cannot be taught, why did Jesus tell his disciples to teach it? If teachers cannot be trusted to teach it, is it because they do not have any, or because they have a wrong definition of it? The need of some form of religious instruction hardly calls for argument or debate. But before the educational and ecclesiastical world will come together in a common assent to this need, both sides will have to make new definitions. The Pharisee in the church is answerable for the distortion of the teaching of Jesus into a burlesque of theology and forms and ceremonies. Religion cannot be taught in our educational system if by religion is meant controversy over matters that are not connected with behaviour. But it can be taught and it must be taught if by it we mean what Jesus meant when he said, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself." If that cannot be taught in our educational system, then the system is wrong. If it can be taught, let us, in the name of Him who came to give us life abundantly, incorporate it into the very heart of our schools, putting it first of all into the heart of our teachers. For education without religion is more than a blunder—it is a falsehood; and if we do not teach religion in the schools, we deserve to suffer as a nation and go the way of all those nations that have thought more of accumulating facts than of making life.

To sum up:—If religion is theology, and doctrine, and creeds made over disputed definitions of God and Theories of man's destiny, it cannot be taught in our schools. But if religion is love to God and man, it can be taught anywhere and it ought to be taught in our schools. If it is not taught, our whole educational pyramid will continue to wobble on its pinnacle instead of resting firmly on its base.

—C. M. Sheldon, in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

## DISCUSSION—SACRIFICE.

By T. Jasper, Wirrilahlee, Warren, N.S.W.

H. B. Irving on one occasion expressed the opinion that sacrifice was easily the most effective card to play in the theatre. The eminent actor should have known his business, but, in any case, we scarcely need his assurance as to the intense admiration self-abnegation excites in the human mind. No matter how foolish, how purposeless the act may be, the applause is usually universal and instantaneous. Sacrifice seems to be regarded as in itself good, regardless of its causes or consequences. Thus it is claimed that war is justifiable, because it helps to stimulate sacrifice. This, from the rational viewpoint, is rather worse than claiming that disease is good because it has been responsible for some remarkable achievements in medical science. In the recent war there was far too much exultation and not sufficient sorrow expressed for the spectacle of youth, with the star dust in its eyes, marching to death and mutilation. That is why we shall probably need another human holocaust to reveal the fact that war, in the ultimate issue, pays profits neither in economic, social, nor spiritual coin.

In the sphere of personal conduct we find sacrificial offerings still applauded and practised, though certainly more applauded than practised. Self-abasement is acclaimed, and while it is likely that the humility we hear expressed is mostly hypocrisy, there is a considerable number of persons who endeavour in all sincerity to immolate their natural egoism to the glory of God. Not only is humility lauded, but even the most extreme and unnatural unselfishness. Altruism is in some measure natural and necessary, but only that form of altruism which arises out of an alliance between egoism and imagination, and which has as its creed "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." The kind of altruism I have in mind is actually an extension of egoism, is deep rooted in self-knowledge and pride, and preserves an enlightened eye for effects. For the rest, man is a gregarious animal, both by nature and necessity, and affection for his fellows is as surely a factor in his being as self-love. The human individual does not, and never will, identify himself with his society as completely as the ant or bee does, but in some cases he is commencing even now to perceive dimly that the greatest individual happiness and the truest individual expression are achievable only in social service—using the phrase in its spiritual significance. Between the new incentive of social service and the old incentive of sacrifice there is a difference at once subtle and significant but a difference that is rather of degree than of kind. The connection I will later endeavour to indicate. But at least, it is evident that because of the psychological revaluations and social emancipations of recent years, the ideas of self-realisation and self-expression have come into conflict in many cases with the philosophy of self-abasement and sacrifice. And so the time is fitting for the consideration of the history of sacrifice, and the interpretations of its peculiar potency. It first made its appearance on the human stage through the instrumentality of the maternal instinct. Apart from the supreme sacrifice of life, which undoubtedly many an early

human mother suffered in defence of her infant, it seems a significant fact that the human offspring demanded more patience, love and care from its mother than were required by the progeny of other species. Our race was early instructed in the rudiments of sacrifice and service. Early in the historical period we find sacrifice closely associated with religious sentiments and beliefs. The most intelligible divinities man created were made, naturally enough, in the image of the temporal tyrants. And since it was usually necessary for barbarian rulers to be ferocious and cruel above the average, and moreover to be savagely suspicious of possible supplanters, the outstanding attributes ascribed to divine authority were anything but idealistic or temperate in nature.

Through their conception of the divine attributes came the idea of sacrificial offerings, and from the belief that the slaughter of animals and captive human beings was pleasing to divine authority came inevitably, to the most idealistic, the somewhat nobler notion that self-sacrifice would be pleasing to God also. This latter idea reached its highest intensity through the agency of Christianity. For so far as we can see through the grimy smoke of mysticism the truth of this matter, the gentle Nazarene appears to have been an astounding paradox—an astounding paradox in so far that he promulgated the extraordinary idea of a God of Love, that yet delighted in human suffering! But Christ's most notable service to humanity was in the inculcation of the idea of human brotherhood. The brotherhood idea had been introduced before his time without being sufficiently expansive to include all classes, but Christ brought even the slave and the harlot within the general relationship. In our time, when human interdependence is being felt more intensely every day, we well may accept the brotherhood Christ poetically visioned, as a scientific fact.

But Christ's voice would not have been heard in the after years were it not for His death on the Cross. Dying for the sake of His cause, He attracted more followers for the sake of His sacrifice than for the sake of His cause. After His death, Christianity came to be a creed of self-sacrifice, and sexual continence, fasting, general self-renunciation and self-scourging came to be esteemed virtues of a high order. It is evident, however, that the inculcation of doctrines of self-submissiveness and self-repression was essential to the exercise of the tyrannical power which the Christian Churches wielded. So it seems likely that that part of Christ's teaching dealing directly with sacrifice was carried far beyond what He intended, while His essential idea, that of a God of love and human fellowship, was obscured for the time. But the intense inculcation of the idea of self-sacrifice effected by Christianity resulted in something much more important than stupid and restrictive religious exercises. The disproportionate progress made by races accepting Christianity, as compared with that made by followers of other faiths, has been frequently noticed, but a suggestion towards solving this problem may be gleaned through tracing the clue of sacrifice into avenues other than religious. On the other hand, however, it is evident that Christianity could only take root where the soil was fitted to germinate its seed in the beginning. It intensified what already existed, and while the revolutionary nature of some of its teaching tended at first to weaken the structure of states that accepted it, the emphasis it placed

on the idea of sacrifice was later found useful in developing and strengthening social systems. Meanwhile, the idea of human brotherhood persisted incongruously but prophetically through the marching years. Religious and civil powers alike drew the despotic strength, so needful if states would survive in the Dark Ages, from the general readiness to sacrifice. It was fanatical support they received of a kind rare enough in our time. And so the question arises—How goes it with the impulse towards sacrifice to-day? As was suggested at the outset, the admiration for sacrifice is still intense, yet it seems probable that the intellectual inclination towards sacrifice is not nearly so great as it has been. We are more sceptical now concerning our beliefs, more prone to criticise our leaders, yet more kindly, more tolerant. We are less impressionable and more reflective. Moreover, the morality of self-sacrifice is being replaced by the morality of self-realisation and self-expression. Apart from intellectual conceptions, however, the direct demand for sacrifice is diminishing, and in the spiritual sphere when a demand diminishes that which supplies it tends to diminish also. (Or it may be to develop into something else.) We are reluctant nowadays to further an opponent's cause by endowing him with a martyr's crown, and more prone than heretofore to look through the play of personalities to the principles that lie beyond. Even the maternal instinct is commencing to lose its sacrificial aspect in civilised communities, owing to the state accepting a certain responsibility for the child. We are more solicitous now concerning the independence of individuals, yet at the same time more impersonal in our ideals. We are becoming more impersonal simply because the real significance of the gregarious instincts is at last emerging — through the medium of self-realisation — in the ideals of social service. In ideas there is a continuous and connected order of development, and with the diminution of the impulse towards sacrifice comes the emergence of the ideas of social service. The moral energy that supported, or still supports, the former, refined and rendered conscious, has flowed, and will continue to flow, into the latter. Through the agency of innumerable dynamos this energy has been developed, but it is particularly to the maternal and gregarious instincts, to patriotism, and to religion, that it owes its strength. These four incentives, be it noted, have been all concerned either with the preservation or unification of parts of the species at least, though in the case of the Christian religion there entered prophetically the idea of an ultimate general unification. The spiritual significance of the impulse to sacrifice is to be found in the fact that it represented the infancy of the idea of social service; the fanatical, impressionable, and ignorant infancy of the impersonal and reflective idea of social service. Something has been lost in emotional intensity, perhaps, but much has been gained in breadth of vision and freedom of movement. The world grows older, and we have no longer the eager, impetuous heart of youth. Action and emotion alone will not now suffice—we must needs question whither we go and why.

## DISCUSSION II—EXAMINATION OF IMMIGRANTS.

By Persia C. Campbell, M.A. (Sydney).

The subject of Dr. Martin's paper in the last issue of the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*—"Examination of Immigrants"—being one of public importance, a discussion on some points made by the writer seems to be desirable. There is no immediate need for panic action against a foreign "invasion." Dr. Martin draws attention to the number of European immigrants who have recently "invaded" Australia as indicating that the tide turned back from U.S.A. is bound to pour into this country or into South America. The statistics of immigrants of white races (exclusive of British and American) who entered Australia from April, 1921, to September, 1924—counting excess of arrivals over departures—was 13,971; it is true there was a slightly increased rate of immigration from certain European countries between October, 1924,–January, 1925, 4,948 Southern Europeans and Finns arriving during that period, but owing to a number of checks, partly administrative and partly natural, this rate was reduced to 271 in February, and this reduction has apparently been maintained. With reference to the American "overflow," it is interesting to note that, most unexpectedly, many of the foreign quotas for U.S.A. were incomplete at the end of the year 1924-5; this is less true for the "nordic" groups than for those from Southern and Eastern Europe—e.g., on 30/6/1925 Italy had an unused quota of approximately 1,100, but the British and German quotas were full. There is time, therefore, to give this matter due deliberation.

Dr. Martin is not concerned with the total number of immigrants into Australia. He advocates (a) discrimination against certain foreign immigrant groups—viz., those from the south and east of Europe—and (b) the adoption of a more stringent policy of individual selection. He supports the first proposal by instancing the social conditions in U.S.A., where the better types have been swamped by the vast hordes of mentally inferior individuals that have crowded into the country under the easy conditions of modern migration and the inducement of comparatively high wages. Presumably this refers to the immigration since 1890 of an increasing number of Southern and Eastern Europeans. May I be permitted here to point out a slight error in fact in the article referred to? It is not true that the population of U.S.A. contains a slight majority of foreign-born over native population. The number of foreign-born in 1920 was 13,920,692, out of a total population of 105,710,620, and many of these were from English-speaking countries. The judgment that many of the newcomers are mentally inferior individuals is based (1) on the army intelligence tests, and (2) on statistics of insanity. It is surely misleading to state that over six million foreign-born persons in U.S.A. were returned as "inferior and worse" according to the results of the army tests, when only those in the white army draft were actually examined. It is open to question whether these young men were a fair sample of the southern immigrant groups, since large numbers—and many of them no doubt of a better type—returned to Europe on the outbreak of the European war to assist

in the political emancipation of minorities or to join the national colours. But let it be admitted that on the tests these groups scored lower than the average native-born or northern immigrant. What is proved thereby? It seems to me unfair to quote figures of results without at the same time making known certain admissions of the examining psychologists and criticisms of military officers. Speaking generally, the immigrants from Northern Europe were literate and English-speaking, and had resided in U.S.A. longer than those from the south and east, many of whom were illiterate and non-English speaking, without any experience of examinations and subjected to a special emotional stress by the "100% American" craze then sweeping the country. It was admitted by the psychologists that on the whole better scores were made on the tests—which, owing to the rush conditions under which the army was raised, were taken as soon as possible after the recruits entered camp—by immigrants the longer their residence in the country. As late as June, 1918, when a special experimental group was examined, the cards of men not born in English-speaking countries were eliminated, since it was not certain at that time that foreign-born men did not suffer a handicap even in beta tests because of language difficulties. The methods used to group recruits into literates and illiterates were determined less by careful planning than by the need of haste. Many of the foreign-born who had picked up enough English to get along with, declared themselves English-speaking, and were permitted to take alpha tests, not being turned over to beta unless they failed in alpha, when they could hardly have been in a proper emotional state to take another examination at once. Many of the groups taking beta numbered from 80-100 persons, and, on the evidence of one commanding officer, in his camp at least it was not always possible for the men in the back of the hall to hear the instructions of the examiner, to say nothing of understanding them. Illiteracy and broken English, which are not to be confused with lack of intelligence, naturally militated against promotion in the army, and the rough classification of recruits made by the psychologists was considered useful by a number of officers. But no responsible officer was prepared to recommend promotions merely on the favourable findings of the psychologists since the tests could not measure a man's capacity for performance on the field, which depended largely on his endurance, perseverance, courage, initiative, and good temper—qualities no less valuable in a colonist than in a soldier.

Dr. Martin also gives statistics of insanity in support of his sweeping indictment against certain foreign immigrant groups. Harry H. Laughlin, of the Eugenics Record Office, an expert authorised by the Congress Committee on Immigration to examine statistics of social inadequacy, submitted evidence in 1922 which showed a high percentage of insanity among the foreign groups we are considering here, and the Irish—especially the Irish! But whether this proves a greater inherent mental instability in these groups is another matter. It must be remembered that large numbers of these immigrants were peasant-farmers in the homeland, or the sons of peasant-farmers; in U.S.A., however, they are under the necessity of adjusting themselves to the unaccustomed and almost dehumanizing conditions endured

by unskilled workers in its great industrial centres. It remains to be shown whether the figures for insanity prove a national characteristic or testify to an appalling industrial condition. And as far as Australia is concerned, it would still have to be shown that the peasant of Europe who fails to adjust himself to city conditions in U.S.A. would not prove a valuable asset as a small farmer in Australia—more valuable, it may be, than the city-worker from Great Britain, who had no feeling for the soil. I have made no investigations into the incidence of insanity in Australia, and can make no comment on that point.

Dr. Martin refers also to the question of assimilation. It is true there are large foreign communities in all the cities of the Eastern States, and they have their own cultured organisations. The immigrant who has not yet acquired English—and this was not an easy matter until the last three or four years, when extra facilities were provided—buys a paper which he can understand, and which will give him some news of “home.” That the foreign language press can perform a valuable function in assimilation has been recognised by the American Government since the outbreak of war, and frequent use is made of it to “get information across” to non-English speaking groups. The important thing to remember is that the cultural organization among the foreign-born does not retain a hold over their children. The fact that this break with the traditional culture of the parents weakens their authority is largely the fault of the American educationalists and others, who until recently—and some still persist in it—worked on the principle of Americanizing by condemning everything foreign. In Australia labour conditions are such that it would not be possible for large numbers of foreign immigrants to secure employment without coming into contact with the unions, and through them directly with the Australian community. This would make the formation of close, exclusive groups almost impossible. It would be still easier to distribute immigrants applying for land under any of the closer settlement schemes by permitting only a certain percentage of blocks to be taken up by foreign applicants. I agree with T. A. Ferry, the Royal Commissioner appointed recently by the Queensland Government to consider the question of foreign immigration, that it is not desirable to have a foreign group forming the majority of inhabitants in any one district, if this can be avoided.

But assume it can be demonstrated that under any circumstances the immigrant groups from Southern and Eastern Europe are mentally inferior to the noble “nordics” from whom we spring. What practical policy can we adopt to discriminate against them? When the U.S.A. first adopted the quota system an attempt was made to regulate it from the American end. This led to the great monthly rush of shipping, to temporarily overcrowded conditions on Ellis Island at the beginning of each month, to pathetic deportations, involving the break-up of families and the return to Europe of persons who had sold their possessions there and broken their old connections. Even a penalty imposed on shipping companies for bringing immigrants in excess of quota—which shifted the responsibility for regulation on to them—could not meet the situation. Public opinion at home and abroad forced a complete change in administrative method. A complicated

system to be controlled by consular officers abroad was evolved, so that no visas in excess of quota would be granted. The Australian Government has stated definitely that without a consular service it is impossible to adopt a similar device for Australia. Instead a series of gentlemen's agreements have been made with some foreign Governments, who undertake to allow the emigration of their nationals to Australia only under certain conditions (Italy), or up to a limited number (Malta, Jugo-Slavia, etc.). The quota basis of some of these agreements is quite arbitrary, and, of course, cannot be rigidly enforced. The Immigration Amendment Act, 1924, is evidence of the Government's inability to devise an effective and definite scheme of regulation. This Act has not been put in force, but it provides that the Governor-General may by proclamation prohibit "either wholly or in excess of specified numerical limits, and either permanently or for a specified period," the immigration of aliens of any specified nationality, race, class, or occupation on certain economic grounds, or "because the persons specified in the proclamation are, in his opinion, unsuitable for admission into the Commonwealth, or because they are deemed unlikely to become readily assimilated, or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Australian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry." It is highly improbable that such a dangerous power will ever be assumed, but if under pressure from public prejudice any nationality were specified as undesirable we would almost certainly be involved in foreign complications not pleasant to contemplate. Great difficulty also lies in the way of individual selection. All countries of immigration exercise the right to reject, at their frontiers, applicants for admission who are suffering from certain physical or mental infirmities. But whatever sovereign rights a State may claim in this matter there is no doubt that international opinion recognizes certain human rights possessed by migrants, and if an elaborate medical and psychological examination is to be adopted of so stringent a character as to lead to large-scale rejections, it will have to be administered at the centres of emigration. This, of course, is specially true where these centres are at a great distance from the country of immigration. This course has already been adopted by the Australian and Canadian Governments under their assisted immigration schemes, a number of medical referees having been appointed in Great Britain for the purpose. On a wider scale it has recently been adopted by U.S.A., a special officer being attached to consulates abroad to issue immigration certificates—which are distinct from visas—to applicants for admission to that country who satisfactorily pass certain examinations required of them. But this is a very elaborate device, for which a numerous and highly trained staff on foreign service is required. This question of individual selection could best be dealt with by an international authority. The international health organisation of the League of Nations in co-operation with the Migration Department of the International Labour Office should be able to administer an international scheme of this kind very satisfactorily. Whether the Governments concerned would authorize it to do so is another matter. I do not think it necessary to comment on the proposal that British immigrants should be subjected to a test for emotional stability, since it is not likely to be adopted.

"The close scrutiny of all foreign immigrants by skilled psychiatrists," presumably merely means a line examination, but extremists in U.S.A. have suggested that immigrants should be registered, and, for a period of time after admission, kept under surveillance. It is highly improbable that Australian public opinion would allow such a system of espionage which would, moreover, militate seriously against the desired assimilation of foreign groups, who would thereby be deprived of security of domicile. For a similar reason I oppose the suggestion to deport insane and mentally deficient immigrants who have been in the country less than five years. Let a satisfactory medical and psychological examination be made at the centres of emigration, if such a course is considered necessary, and then shift the cost of subsequent insanity—presumably mental deficiency would be detected by the examiners—on to the countries of immigration. This may help the community to realise that immigrants have rights as well as obligations in the difficult process of adjustment and assimilation.\*

## RESEARCHES AND REPORTS.

### INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY, A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY.

By R. Simmat, B.A., Science Research Scholar in Psychology, University of Sydney.

The first applications of Psychology to industrial problems were made by Professor Muensterberg, of Harvard. The publication of his work, "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency" in 1913, laid the corner stone of "Vocational Selection." Since then many new psychological aspects of industrial problems have been opened up. At present the main divisions of the field are as follows:—

*Vocational Psychology.*—By this is meant the psychological study of individuals with reference to the requirements of different vocations, with the object of guiding individuals into vocations for which their endowments fit them.

*Motion Study.*—This requires, first, an analysis of the different movements made by a worker, and then the elimination of unnecessary movements for the purpose of lessening fatigue and increasing efficiency.

*Fatigue Study.*—A wider aspect than the former field is involved here, since the duration of working hours, rest pauses, postures of the worker, and physical conditions generally are enquired into both for the betterment of working conditions as well as from the standpoint of increased production.

*Salesmanship and Advertising.*—This study attempts to analyse the situations which occur in making a sale, or in making known a product to the general public. Many of the general principles of psychology are involved, but, in addition, particular aspects of research in these directions are also included.

*Psychology of Management.*—This field lays emphasis on the importance of understanding the general motivation of the worker, which is often

---

\* See Senate Documents, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 1920-21, Report of Division of Psychology, for discussion of U.S.A. Army Tests.

obscured by the modern emphasis upon the "economic urge." Such an understanding of the personality of the worker assists in the application of tactful measures in place of maintaining an uncompromising opposition to the workers' claims and desires.

The following texts form a brief bibliography which may prove a useful introduction to those seeking a knowledge of the subject of Industrial Psychology and its problems. Books marked with an asterisk are specially recommended.

#### GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY.

\*Woodworth, R. S.—"Psychology: A Study of Mental Life." (London, Methuen, 1922. 8/6.)

Seashore, C. S.—"Introduction to Psychology." (London, MacMillan, 1923. 10/6.)

McDougall, W.—"Outlines of Psychology." (London, Methuen, 1923. 12/-.)

\*Terman, L. M.—"The Measurement of Intelligence." (London, Harrap, 1919. 7/6.)

#### INTRODUCTIONS TO INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Drever, J.—"The Psychology of Industry." (London, Methuen, 1921. 5/-.)

\*Myers, C. S.—"Mind and Work." (London, University of London Press, 1920. 3/6.)

Muscio, B.—"Lectures on Industrial Psychology." (London, Routledge, 1917. 6/6.)

Muscio, B.—Editor, "Lectures on Industrial Administration." (London, Pitman, 1920. 6/-.)

#### VOCATIONAL SELECTION.

Hollingworth, H. L.—"Vocational Psychology." (London, Appleton, 1916. 12/6.)

\*Link, H. C.—"Employment Psychology." (New York, MacMillan, 1919. 12/-.)

Muensterberg, H.—"Psychology and Industrial Efficiency." (London, Constable, 1913. 14/-.)

#### MOTION STUDY.

Gilbreth, F. B.—"Motion Study." (London, Constable, 1911. 9/6.)

\*Gilbreth, F. B.—"Applied Motion Study." (London, Sturgis and Walton, 1917. 8/6.)

\*(For further bibliography see Eric Farmer, "Time and Motion Study," No. 14 of the Publications of the National Fatigue Research Board. Price 2/6.)

#### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT.

\*Fitt, A. B.—"The Human Instincts in Business." (Sydney, Lothian Publishing Co., 1922. 3/6.)

Gilbreth, L. M.—"The Psychology of Management." (London, Pitman, 1914. 7/6.)

\*Tead, O.—"Instincts in Industry." (London, Constable, 1918, 10/6.)

\*Watts, F.—“An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry.” (London, Allen and Unwin, 1921. 12/6.)

Dickinson, Z. C.—“Economic Motives.” (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1922.)

For *Fatigue, Advertising, and Salesmanship*, see general Text-books.  
MAGAZINES.

\*“Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology.” (London, £1 per annum.)

“Reports of the National Fatigue Research Board.” (H.M. Press, London.) (No. 12 of these contains a bibliography of “Vocational Guidance,” by B. Muscio.)

“Journal of Applied Psychology.” (Chandler, Worcester, Mass. 4/- per annum.)

“Die Praktische Psychologie.” (Hirzel, Leipzig, 20 marks per annum.)

---

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

### ECCLESIASTES AND THE EARLY GREEK WISDOM LITERATURE.

By H. Ranston, Litt.D. Epworth Press, London, 1925. 6/- net.

Among the ancient Hebrews there arose a class of literature known as *Hokmah*, or Wisdom literature, composed of homely saws, shrewd observations on human life, and general maxims as to conduct in prosperity and adversity. Among the books of this class that of Ecclesiastes (Koheleth) arrests attention, because of its difference of tone. This Hebrew Omar Khayyam contemplates man as the victim of an unintelligible order. He is oppressed by the limitations of human life, the inability of man to struggle against destiny, and the futility of all endeavour, which can produce nothing of permanent worth. To the recurrent refrain, “vanity of vanities; all is vanity,” he utters one long wail over the hapless lot of mortals. Life is burdened with monotony; old age comes cheerless and without the zest of pleasure. Wisdom brings sorrow, while the wise man dieth even as the fool. Therefore, *Carpe diem.*: “I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing under the sun than to eat and to drink and to be merry.” Yet the author was no sensualist. He inculcates conjugal felicity, and the avoidance of extremes in both vice and virtue. He would regulate enjoyment and encourage activity, even despite its resultlessness. And his deep pessimism keeps company with a belief in God. But his faith achieves no victory. God’s plans are incomprehensible, and therefore afford no guide for life. As for human destiny, “man hath no pre-eminence above the beasts. All go unto one place.” A comfortless place indeed is this realm of death: “The dead know not anything. Neither have they any more a reward. As well their love as their hatred and their envy, is now perished.” “There is no work nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in Sheol.”

Many theories have been put forward to account for this book and its presence in the Hebrew Scriptures. Some regard it as a genuine product of native Semitic Wisdom. But most scholars admit the influence of Hellenic thought, either generally, or particularly that of Heraclitus, or

the Stoics and Epicureans. A recent thorough investigation of the problem is Dr. Ranston's "Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature," in which he asserts that Koheleth is not a "native Hebrew spirit. He has nothing of that sense of divine fellowship which ever characterised the O.T. saint. No wonder that many of his own people, the most optimistic race in history, did not like his book, and that the author of the *Book of Wisdom* set himself to correct him." The words: "He tested and sought out and set in order many proverbs" suggested to Ranston an examination of the early Greek gnomic philosophy between Homer and Aeschylus. A careful comparison, with plentiful citations, is made between the sentiments of Koheleth and those of Theognis, Hesiod, Phokylides, Xenophanes, Archilochus, Simonides of Ceos, and Solon. Thus as Koheleth sees good and evil perplexingly intertwined and man's ignorance and helplessness in regard to the future, so Theognis, "Nothing is defined by Deity for mortals, nor the road in which a man must go to please the Immortals." "No man toils, knowing within his heart whether the issue be good or ill. Our thoughts are vain; we know nothing; the gods accomplish all things according to their own mind," or "'Tis most difficult to know the end of a matter undone, how God will bring it to pass. Gloom is spread over it; before the future comes to be the issues of helplessness are not intelligible to mortals." Ranston's conclusion is that "Theognis was the main source of the foreign aphorisms of Koheleth's book." This scholarly New Zealand work will be welcomed by readers of Koheleth. Ranston's thesis is ably maintained, and must be reckoned with in future study of the Hebrew Wisdom literature and of the relations between Hebraism and Hellenism.

—S. Angus.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Vol. II. New York, Columbia University Press, 1925. \$3.00.

As we might expect of a product of Columbia, this volume tends to show what a lively interest in the history of philosophy can directly do towards the solution of contemporary problems.

In "The 'Socratic' Dialogues of Plato" Professor Dewey urges that we apply to these early dialogues the same method of interpretation that has recently been adopted with the later. Indeed, he holds, the mere application of psychology to Platonic criticism should discredit the view that even in the earlier dialogues Plato is out to celebrate Socrates and his victories over bygone Sophists. Rather is he there using these Sophists as figureheads for his own rivals, certain contemporary schools of his earlier period, in particular the naturalistic Cynics and the humanistic Cyrenaics. The point is that these are Socratic schools, and in depicting the refutation of their symbolic exponents by Socrates (which is as chronologically possible a situation as—let us say—that of the Parmenides), Plato is trying to show that he alone stands for the true Socratic tradition, while the professed successors of Socrates do but divide the crumbs that fall from the Master's table. How otherwise are we to account for the spectacle of Socrates, in these dialogues,

elaborately refuting typical Socratic arguments? The two partial views of virtue referred to—the naturalistic, with its emphasis on habituation based on natural aptitudes; the humanistic, with its insistence on the rational character of virtue—can only be combined in a single coherent doctrine if brought under the conception of a knowledge of the good, or wisdom. That subsumption takes place in the practical realm of politics. So when it is said that virtue is knowledge, it must be understood that this is the vicarious knowledge of the rulers, under whose direction virtue, in the great mass of its bearers, will still, as it must, be formed on a basis of right opinion and habituation. I would remark that in view of much contemporary clap-trap about the need for assigning the individual to the place for which he is "naturally" fitted by his "individuality," it is refreshing to be reminded that in Plato's *Republic*, so freely cited in support of this, the moral is rather that, save under the personal rule of philosophers, such schemes can only end in disaster.

Then Professor McClure argues that "The Theme of Plato's *Republic*" is the coincidence of virtue with happiness, making in support a useful analysis of the structure of the dialogue. Nowhere in it, he says, is justice divorced from interest. On this topic the author seems to me, when in dealing with Thrasymachus he takes the essence of Socrates' reply to be that an art is always in the interest of ends beyond itself, to fail to allow for the situation created by Thrasymachus' midway revision of his argument; his new position being, briefly, that the proposition, A.'s promotion of B.'s interest is just, implies and is implied by, B. is stronger than A. There is now no question of the interest of the stronger being sought or not by the art of the stronger; the weaker is already promoting it by his art or habit of "justice."

Among the modern studies Professor Balz's "Dualism in Cartesian Psychology and Epistemology" is remarkable for its thoroughness. He finds the key to Descartes' development from his position in the "Rules" to the views of the "Discourse," "Meditations," and "Principles" in the emergence of the two-substance doctrine. This is taken to explain how Descartes incurs the difficulties of the attempt to treat sense and imagination, viewed in his earlier work as caused but cognizable, later on as caused and yet cognitive. A possible source of confusion is the author's identification (*v. p. 146*) of things with objects. Objective existence in Descartes means, of course, always intentional existence.

In an equally solid contribution on "Empiricism and Epistemology in David Hume," Professor Lamprecht develops, in detailed reference to Hume's writings, the view, now finding increasing acceptance, according to which Hume's subjectivist and psychologistic tendencies are only accidental to his empiricism, and indeed are fundamentally at variance with it.

Two of the studies, "A Note on the Interpretation of German Idealism" (H. L. Friess) and "The Significance of Benjamin Franklin's Moral Philosophy" (H. W. Schneider), are attempts to interpret their philosophers rather by their contemporary cultural environment than by doctrinal antecedents. The latter of these essays may specially interest

readers in this part of the world in contending that what explains Franklin is not a "Puritan" tradition, but the conditions of a pioneer community. Franklin's "business" ethics are disciplinary, a morality of means. The mistake of the usual (derogatory) estimate of them is that it begins by setting them in comparison with ethics of ends or ideals. The fair comparison would rather be with some other disciplinary ethics, e.g., the Christian. "The contrast between the Yankee and the Christian types of character is familiar enough." Dr. Schneider admits, however, that humility figured on Franklin's original list of virtues.

The book would make an excellent basis for discussions parallel to a course on history of philosophy. From this point of view, the only noteworthy omission is Aristotle. Professor Montague, however, is perhaps more in the spirit of the volume in once more setting a modern problem in a new light by the application of Aristotelian conceptions. In "The Missing Link in the Case for Utilitarianism" he seeks to solve Mill's difficulty in establishing distinctions of quality among pleasures by the use of the concept of potentiality (suggested by Mill's theory of matter) together with that of dimensionality. Virtue is a permanent potentiality, of which happiness occurs as the successive actualizations. Virtue, then, has a value not different in kind from, but immeasurably greater in quantity than that of happiness, as in the relation of a sphere to its circular cross-sections. Is there not a similar suggestion in Mill's oft-scouted argument in the ethical sphere itself:—Visible: seen:: audible: heard:: desirable: desired?

The paper of W. F. Cooley, on "The Lure of Metaphysical Simplicity" should disturb the complacency of some scientists who think they are not metaphysicians. Quotation must suffice here. "Unity signifies properly either the first integer in the number series, or else something which, while composite, is yet single through its structural organization around some central point or purpose." Again, "Potency and actuality may reasonably be regarded as the deeper metaphysical account of the more obvious phases known as simplicity and complexity. . . . The lower pole most adequate for thought is potency, and potency conceived as underlying even the most elementary mechanism. *Speculatively*, we have at least an equal right to conceive of existence as intensively rich—that is, capable, even when without mechanical structure, of various forms of function—while *empirically* perhaps the most surprising thing about the new physics is its great enlargement of the field of potency, the iron atom, for example, being now endowed with a hundred or more possible forms of activity. If the radical mechanist insists that these *must* be due to mechanical complexities, it is because his faith is functioning rather than his facts."

—W. Anderson.

THE MYSTERY RELIGIONS AND CHRISTIANITY: A Study of the Religious Background of Early Christianity. London: John Murray, 1925. Pp. xvi., 357.

The recent volume of Dr. Angus' on the Mystery Religions traverses an already well-trodden field, but the path taken is a new one. The book exhibits no marked apologetic or polemical bias. It is not written

to prove that Christianity in the Roman Empire was little influenced by the Mystery Religions nor, on the other hand, to show that it was merely a réchauffé of these ubiquitous cults. Again, it is not a mere description of the individual Mysteries, or all of them together, although it does include a comprehensive survey, an ensemble picture, so to speak, marked by clarity of outline and precision of detail. It is, rather, a successful attempt to explain why the Mystery Religions almost succeeded in conquering the Roman Empire, and yet in the end fell before the victorious march of Christianity. Attention to this dominating problem gives unity to the book and sustains the reader's interest to the end.

In a chapter which admirably summarizes the political and religious conditions under which Christianity and the Mystery Religions met for their death-grapple, Dr. Angus discusses "the historical crises of the Graeco-Roman world in their bearing" upon his subject. The bankruptcy of Greek religion and the disintegrating influence of Greek philosophy, the new cosmopolitanism which followed in the steps of Alexander, the contribution of the Jews to ancient thinking, and the results of Rome's contacts with the East are rapidly sketched. Two chapters then picture the nature of a Mystery Religion. The first, "What is a Mystery Religion?" describes it as a "system of religious symbolism," a "sacramental drama," a "religion of redemption," an "eschatological," a "personal," and also a "cosmic religion." The second portrays and analyzes the various rites and ceremonies of the Mystery initiations and what they offered to their votaries, emphasizing "the three stages" common to all of the Mystery cults, (1) preparation and probation, (2) initiation and communion, and (3) *epopteia* and blessedness.

In two further chapters Dr. Angus returns to the subject already summarily surveyed in the opening chapter, the historical conditions which made the spread of the Mystery Religions possible. Under the general title, "The Appeal of the Mystery Religions," he rehearses (a) the "conditions favourable to the spread of the Mysteries," and (b) "the religious needs of the Graeco-Roman world and their symptoms." The unification of mankind by Alexander and the Romans, the powerful reflex action of the Orient upon the Occident, the collapse of the *Polis* and the aristocratic classes, the growth of the influence of the common people, the preparatory development of Orphism, the spread of Astralism, and the resurgence of Chthonism were the conditions which contributed to the spread of syncretism and individualism, the development of a new sense of sin and failure, a universal longing for salvation, a yearning for immortality, and the rise of asceticism and private religious associations epoch-making in character and extent.

The final pair of chapters gives the reasons for the ultimate success of Christianity, so far as it was a matter of the competition of cults, exhibiting the defects of the Mysteries and the outstanding merits and the chief weapons of propaganda which gave the final victory to Christianity. The defects which defeated the Mysteries were their atavism to primitive naturalism, their union with the pseudo-religion, Magic, and with the pseudo-science, Astrology, the extreme individualistic-mystic types of reli-

gion which they fostered, and their vagueness and theological weakness. Christianity won because of its intolerance, that is, its refusal to compromise its fundamental convictions, because of its genuine universality, because of the new religious force in Christian "faith," because of its possession of an accessible and appealing religious document, the Bible, because of its satisfying message for the widespread sorrows of the ancient world, and because in Jesus it had an unique historical and personal centre.

Dr. Angus' purpose and plan enable him to include in a comprehensive view all the movements which partake of the nature of a Mystery Religion. Not only Isis and Serapis, Cybele and Attis, Mithra, Dea Syria, and other Oriental cults, Orphism, the Eleusinia, and other Greek and Hellenistic Mysteries, but also Hermetism and Gnosticism are among the materials from which he draws. The state religions of the Greek and Roman cities also come into the survey, for it was their failure to satisfy men's moral and religious needs that made the success of the Mystery Religions inevitable. The book, therefore, becomes in effect a discussion of the whole moral and religious environment of Early Christianity, thus notably supplementing and enlarging the excellent but briefer discussions of the author's *Environment of Early Christianity*.

The restriction of the subject matter to the religious needs of the Graeco-Roman world and to the mystical elements of religion as seen in the Mysteries leads to the exclusion or cursory treatment of the other social, especially the economic, factors which contributed to the victory of Christianity. More attention is of necessity given to mysticism than to morals. The ethical and social appeal inhering in the Christian apocalyptic message of the imminent Kingdom of Righteousness, a message that spoke straight to the heart of a world that for millennia had been longing and looking for a righteous King to be sent by God, is not adequately subsumed under the caption of a "personal ethical ideal" (p. 313). In other words, the book does not attempt to give a complete answer to the question, "Why did Christianity prevail?" But in the presence of the superabundance of materials it offers one is ungrateful to speak of sins of omission.

The title of the book might lead one to expect a fuller treatment of one moot problem in the field of New Testament study, that is the influence of the Mysteries on Primitive Christianity. Dr. Angus believes that Paul was not directly affected by any of the Mysteries and, although he must have been familiar with the main religious ideas of the Mystery cults and touched by the mysticism that was "in the air," his unique "faith-mysticism" was the product of his own religious experience (p. 295 f.). Likewise the numerous allusions to matters in which the conquered cults took revenge on the conqueror by effecting subtle changes in Christianity herself might have been summed up in a chapter which would have been a valuable contribution to the discussion of the permanent and the passing in Christian faith and practice. A much fuller discussion of the problem of Paul and of the whole subject of Christianity's debt for good and ill to the Mystery Religions from a writer of such comprehensive familiarity with the sources and sound judgment would have been most welcome.

Not the least of the strong points of the treatment is its close contact with the original sources. Professor Angus is an adept at fitting in the right phrase from the vast literature his industrious reading has covered to illumine the exact meaning he wishes to convey. Every page, therefore, bristles with allusions to ancient and modern authors. The conclusions are independently formed on the basis of the ancient evidence, which is liberally supplied for the reader's satisfaction.

The long bibliographies of ancient and modern writers, while denominat- ed only selective and not exhaustive, are certainly the most complete available and add greatly to the worth of the book. The excellent index of authors, both ancient and modern, enhances its usefulness to the student. One might wish a fuller index of subjects, but the complete analysis of the argument given in the table of contents goes far to atone for its lacunæ. The small number of slips in proof-reading is remarkable in a volume so large and containing such a mass of technical material.

It is a fascinating world through which Professor Angus guides us, a very modern world in its cosmopolitanism, its love of novelties, its endless variety of cults, its social evils, and its thirst for religious certainty. We can but be deeply grateful for the illuminating comment of an interpreter who knows this ancient world intimately and understands how to make it live again before our eyes.

—Chester C. McCown (Pacific School of Religion,  
Berkeley, California, U.S.A.)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMILE BOUTROUX. By Lucy S. Crawford, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Sweet Briar College, Virginia, New York: Longmans. (Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 16.)

This book of 153 pages reaches page 92 before dealing with Boutroux's philosophy, thus giving us precisely 61 pages on that master mind who gives the title to the book. Indeed, it is a thesis on modern French Idealism from Maine de Biran to Boutroux, and the author appears to be unaware that some works already covering this ground in English were published some years before her own appeared. No mention, however, is made of the London book on the same subject, not even in the bibliography. Miss Stebbing's little volume on *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* (published ten years previously) is, like *Modern French Philosophy*, either ignored by, or admitted by, the author. These facts make one surprised. Another quaint omission, but one which is perhaps less serious, is Dwelshauvers' book in French on the psychologists of the same period published in 1920. Parodi's book, "La Philosophie Contemporaine," is cited in the bibliography. The books on the period are not well known to the author, while the Bibliography of the writers themselves is poorly done, even the Boutroux section is not what it might be. Ruggiero's *Modern Philosophy* has been referred to. The section of this Italian work which is devoted to French Philosophy is unsympathetic and unreliable, as it presents and criticises French Philosophy from the standpoint of Italian work. Stimulating and scathing as it is, it is not a good history, and hardly a book to be relied on so much by a writer who has herself covered the ground of reading.

The work is well documented with scholarly footnotes and quotations, and what has been done is quite well done. Boutroux has been mastered, but if the attempt is made to place Boutroux in his environment it must be done thoroughly by a discussion of the Eclectics, Positivists, as well as Maine de Biran, the Traditionalists, and the later lines of development, first in Vacherot, Taine, and Renan; secondly, in neo-Kantianism, in Cournot, and the great Renouvier; thirdly, in the neo-idealistic succession of Ravaissón, Lachelier, Fouillée, Guyau, Bergson, and Blondel. Cournot is treated, but Renouvier is given an inadequate place, while Fouillée, Bergson, and Blondel are apologised for by their absence.

The book falls between two stools, it is neither a mere study of Boutroux nor an adequate work on modern French philosophy, even Idealism. We have 61 pages on Boutroux and 92 on French Idealism in the nineteenth century. It will not do. The treatment is too sectional, and cannot be done otherwise in such small compass save by a skilled surgeon who can lay bare the whole tendons of idealist thought. Here only certain organs have been examined, and the diagnosis is incomplete. Either the work should have been mainly devoted to Boutroux (which it is not), or kept until an adequate survey of French Idealism could have been written (including Renouvier, and, of course, Fouillée, both of whom wrote a great many volumes, which may be the reason for their being discounted).

There are some careless misprints in the bibliography which makes the reader doubtful again whether the author really knows the literature of the period adequately. With the exposition of Boutroux in the 61 pages we have no quarrel, and this shows the author can do good work, within these limits. Heavy and scholarly footnotes in several languages give the book a stately appearance, but it will not compensate for the exhibition of the figure of Boutroux against a canvas which is huge but only half-painted.

—J. Alexander Gunn.

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. J. R. Kantor. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1924.

In general, accounts of psychological theory have levied contributions upon two main fields, the analytic and comparative, and their derivatives. The former investigates a process as it manifests itself in individuals under laboratory experimental conditions; the second method is non-laboratory and observational, and generally tends to develop a genetic approach. A further method, the psycho-analytic, combines some of the features of both of these. Despite disagreements, a considerable body of classified knowledge has been built up, progress having been attained by modifications of older theories.

Kantor, in his "Principles," however, adopts a Cartesian standpoint; taking up a naïve attitude, he proceeds to his own general classification of psychological phenomena, and almost completely sweeps aside existing forms; thus his work is rather in the nature of a recasting of the science. While such a procedure is traditional in philosophical systems, the experiment is somewhat novel in its application to the daughter science, for even

the "heresies" of Watsonian behaviourism retain much of the traditional groundwork. While philosophy must be considered largely as a discipline in method, the main business of psychology is to present a scientific content, and the greater part of this, despite the differing camps into which those who profess this subject have of late been gathered, is still current medium. One disadvantage under which this critique, as well as any other wholesale attempt at remodelling our science must labour, is to draw upon itself the hostility of the "group." Again, its adoption by any considerable number would prevent any communal approach at solving psychological problems on account of its new nomenclature, and would render present confusion worse confounded.

He begins by an insistence on the principle of "organismic behaviour," which involves the activity of the whole organism, or, in the case of the human being, the whole personality in any expression of behaviour. Such reactions or forms of behaviour may be appropriately divided into segments, which do not necessarily imply the Brentanian triad of cognition, affection and conation, but possibly only one of these. Thus for him, association, feeling, or attention are as much a complete activity response as are the factors of awareness, with its concomitants of feeling tone and will response for the traditional psychologist.

Three levels of activity are distinguished which appear to follow the neural correlates of spinal, thalamic, and cerebral activities, but his terms for these are entirely novel. Activities of the first level are styled by him "foundational types," and the next comprise forms of "basic reactions." The latter, despite Kantor's insistence on their acquired nature, conform in the main to the traditional list of instincts formulated by McDougall. Thus, writes Kantor, we may for illustrative purposes isolate the following: Protective, manipulatory, exhibitive, approbative, recessive, acquisitive reactions, etc., all of which might, without forcing, be cheerfully conceded by all moderate psychological thinkers. Even Kantor's insistence upon the acquired nature of such reactions does not invalidate the innateness of such dispositions, while even McDougall himself, the recognised champion of the latter aspect, conceded the educability of such dispositions in his first formulation of the doctrine of instincts. The final level is denominated "societal conduct," which is distinctively human and exceedingly complex. Such a level by no means implies the constant influences of a social agent upon the subject, but rather the general influence of social guidance in shaping the situations by which the individual is surrounded. Such reactions comprise four main types: (a) Suprabasic Forms, which develop from basic forms, and which appear to include what is generally understood by psychologists as sentiments and complexes; (b) Contingential Forms, which appear to be responses to problem situations; (c) Cultural Reactions, which are perhaps more directly societary than the others, since they comprise such reactions as conformity to customs, conventions, fashions, etc., and the acceptance of institutions, the accounts of tradition, and the data of sciences; and (d) Idiosyncratic Reactions, which refer to peculiar and individual modes of behaviour to various stimuli.

The major portion of the work (chapters viii.-xv.) is devoted to a treatment of the traditional psychological phenomena, but from a definitely Kantorian viewpoint in many cases. Thus, in reference to association, there is given a detailed classification of forms that are essentially his own, according to the various combinations of "settings," "stimuli," and "reactions." In volitional conduct such forms generally considered as ideo-motor, are classified by him as voluntary, and the term habit is stretched to include not merely motor responses, but all forms of mental mneme, such as memories, sentiments, complexes, etc.

Kanto's treatise is difficult to read, and is lacking in detailed illustrative examples, coins new terms, which add still further to his somewhat forbidding presentation. While there can be no objection to such as are absolutely essential, surely such forms as "suprabasic," "misreaction," "foundational," "societal," or "contingential" require justification before their general acceptance.

The "Principles" stand as an interesting attempt to recast the science of psychology. That it is a fully adequate one remains for the future to decide. Its probable effect will be to provide a critique for certain current concepts, or to correct certain inadequacies of present classification or connotation. If it accomplish this, it will have rendered an invaluable service. It is the opinion of this reviewer that, except for a few initiates, it will never replace the current psychological outlook as represented in modern texts.

A. H. Martin.

DIE LEBENSPSYCHOLOGIE VON MULLER-FREIENFELS. By Paul Feldkeller. Reprinted from *Die Akademie*, Erlangen, 1924.

Müller-Freienfels belongs to the "democratic" type of thinker (Locke and Hume to James, Vaihinger, Ostwald), as opposed to the "aristocratic" type (Plato and Plotinus to Hegel and Nietzsche). The author asserts further that no other "Forscher," living or dead, has investigated so thoroughly the "irrationality of the thought-process," and that his capacity for this task far surpasses that of James and Bergson. M.-F.'s Psychology is an "Einstellungs" psychology as opposed to any "Vorstellungs" psychology, and in general to all "Intellectualism." The springs of life and thought are to be sought for in the instincts and dispositions, and not in "vorstellungen." His psychology is "impressionistic," "vital-realistic," and "aktivistic." Dr. Feldkeller's summary is too condensed, and perhaps over-eulogistic. But M.-F.'s works (*Psychology of Art*, 1920; *Outline of a "Lebenspsychologie,"* 1916-24; *Philosophy of Individuality*, 1923) are still unknown to most English students of philosophy.

—Editor.

(1) THE MEASURED JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICAL MEN IN THE WOOL TRADE. Henry Binns. (2) A COMPARISON OF VISUAL AND TACTUAL JUDGMENT. H. Binns and H. S. Raper. (Reprints from the "Wool Record and Textile World".)

These two papers provide an account of some experiments in applied psychology in reference to the wool trade; they are thus of direct interest

to Australian readers. The former is an experiment by means of the "order of merit method," to demonstrate the value of subjective opinion in grading different qualities of textiles. The second paper gives details of an experiment in visual and tactal discrimination, the material being very fine wires of (27-36) standard gauge. The capacities thus measured appear to depend originally upon innate capacity, which may be increased by general training in these directions.

—A. H. Martin

**PHYSICO-CHEMICAL EVOLUTION.** By Charles E. Guye, Professor of Physics at the University of Geneva. Translated by J. R. Clarke. Pp. xii.-172. Price 6/-. Methuen & Co., London.

The Physicist-eum-Philosopher is apt to be regarded as a strange, and even dangerous, animal by both philosophers and physicists, but the hardy spirit common to all pioneers sustains Professor Guye in his stout attempt to discover a monistic philosophy. The first of his three essays is devoted to the possibility of a unification of all the sciences on lines suggested by the unification of space and time in the theories of Einstein and Minkowski. A clear exposition is given in the second essay of the fundamental bearing of the Calculus of Probabilities on Physico-chemical phenomena, and on the real significance of Carnot's Principle. With the ground thus cleared, the author proceeds in the last essay to an interesting discussion of the possible ways of accounting for Life and Thought in a scheme which also includes physico-chemical phenomena. In the possibility of deducing the ordinary laws of the latter as the statistical results of an infinite variety of different possible laws attaching to the ultimate particles of matter, he sees the existence of laws essentially more general than the statistical ones to which they give rise. He thus arrives at an outline of a monistic philosophy, in which the underlying idea is that the two ultimate constituents of all matter, namely, the electron and the proton, are not completely defined by the conceptions of number, space, time, and matter, which suffice to express physico-chemical phenomena, but that with these two elements must also be associated *some other conception*. In other words, the electron or proton (or both) contains the element of life in itself. This book shows the usual Gallic clarity of thought and expression, and (to borrow one of its phrases), it effectively illustrates "the powerful philosophic fertility of the new statistical conception of Carnot's Principle."

—V. A. Bailey.

**EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE BASIC WAGE:** Lectures and Papers Published in connection with the Pitt Cobbett Foundation, 1925. Pp. 48. University of Tasmania. 1/-.

The late Professor Pitt Cobbett, of Sydney University, left the sum of £5,000 as a bequest for the purpose of promoting better relations between employers and employees. The bequest was bestowed upon the University of Tasmania, which accordingly requires, *inter alia*, that a Lecturer shall undertake annually a certain number of public lectures, with this object in view. This booklet contains a reprint of Mr. Baldwin's famous speech

on the Evolution of Industry, and addresses by Mr. Booth, of Cadbury-Fry-Pascall, Limited, and Mr. Baker, of the Electrolytic Zinc Works, showing how these two firms endeavour in various ways to foster harmonious relationship between "masters and men," but the greater part of it consists of fairly full reports of the Pitt Cobbett Lectures for 1925, delivered by Professor J. B. Brigden. They are largely based upon the report of the recent Economic Commission on the Queensland Basic Wage, of which Professor Brigden was a member. The lectures deal with wages and their regulation, arbitration, capitalism, and similar subjects; the wording is simple, and the ideas are clearly expressed; by arousing interest in their subject and spreading knowledge concerning it they should do much to promote the object for which they were given.

—F. C. Benham.

A STUDY OF PRACTICAL ABILITY. By Margaret McFarlane, B.A., Ph.D. Monograph Supplement, No. 8. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1925. Price 7/-.

A most striking feature of modern psychology and modern life is the drive against intellectualism. No doubt there is justification for some change in attitude; the old psychology tended unduly to ignore the animal aspects of our nature, and to neglect the heritage handed down to us by the old Adam. But is not the reaction being overdone? Are we not witnessing a rush to anti-intellectualism and emotionalism as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than, the older absorption in "things of the mind"?

In this mental atmosphere it was to be expected that the intelligence tests of Binet and his imitators would not remain in undisputed possession of the field. For the attention to the nature of intelligence aroused by these tests has not resulted in any unanimity as to what really constitutes intelligence. Is it unitary, as so many maintain, or binary, as Spearman and his followers believe? Further, the linguistic character of so many of the tests and the narrow field of aptitudes that they explore have led to the introduction of other kinds of tests, for some investigators have realised that children who fail in the intelligence tests may nevertheless prove themselves able to deal with the situations and problems of life. The introduction of some tests of "practical ability" has been hastened by the necessity of dealing with those for whom merely linguistic tests are quite unsuitable, e.g., defectives and foreigners. Thus has been raised the question: Is it possible to devise some reliable test of practical ability? And if it is, how will such a test correlate with the ordinary intelligence tests?

In Miss McFarlane's monograph will be found a good summary of problems and methods, and a full account of her own interesting experiments. In all phases of this problem a good deal depends on the meaning attached to the term "practical ability." Miss McFarlane takes a broad view; she understands by the term "the subject's total response to a problem of a certain kind, viz., one which demands for its solution changing some portion of the physical world." This involves grasp of the problem, ability to plan the series of movements necessary to bring about the change, and ability to execute the movements successfully.

After some preliminary experiments the investigator selected the following tests: Putting together the parts of (1) a wheelbarrow (eight pieces), (2) a cradle (eight pieces), (3) a frock, and (4) a coat (each of seven pieces fastened together by press-buttons), (5) painted cube (consisting of 27 small cubes), and (6) Healey's Puzzle Box, and (7) McDougall's Plunger Apparatus. The final experiments were carried out on 49 children in New York City, and 356 children (172 boys and 184 girls) in London. The groupings were so arranged that they threw light on the relation between proficiency in the tests and skill in certain technical school subjects, the effect of age on performance, and the comparison of performance of boys and girls.

One of the most interesting results of the investigation is the low factor of correlation between these tests and the intelligence tests. Yet Miss McFarlane agrees with Koehler in thinking that proficiency is due to "ideational grasp of," or insight into, the nature of the problem. Miss McFarlane's explanation of the apparently paradoxical result that these responses are intelligent, but are not measured by the ordinary intelligence tests is that in practical ability the main differences are due to the nature of the material used. "We have arrived at the conception of practical ability as a special ability differing from other special abilities not so much in virtue of different mental processes involved as in the nature of the material upon which these processes are directed. Like literary or mathematical ability, practical ability involves analysis and synthesis, judgment and conception; its uniqueness lies in the fact that those persons possessing it in a high degree analyse and judge better about concrete and spatial situations than do other individuals who perhaps excel in dealing with more highly abstract symbols." (P. 56.) As the authoress shows, this opens up wide and diverse fields for further investigation. But does it not also suggest that there can be no standardization in the testing of intelligence, that we shall require different classes of tests for each type of intelligence? Who, then, is to judge whether failure in a test indicates sub-normality or a new type? Standardization of the tests over large numbers of children would probably show whether the writer's deduction is sound or not. If it is, it will have a very wide-reaching effect on the use of the ordinary intelligence tests and on educational methods.

—T. A. Hunter.

Received from Harrap & Co., London:

Modern English Series: Narrative Essays and Sketches, Selected by H. A. Treble and G. H. Vallins, 2/6. Goldsmith's Essays, Selected by A. H. Sleight, 2/6. The New Readers' Shakespeare: Merchant of Venice, Ed. by G. B. Harrison and F. H. Pritchard Twelfth Night, by same editors.

Received from Dr. Paul Feldkeller, Berlin. Das Maschinenideal in Philosophie und Kultur (from Die Akademie). Die Deutsche Ethik der Gegenwart (from Geisteskultur).

The following publications of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart have been received (Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero," Milan).

Immanuel Kant: Centenary Commemoration vol. by A. Gemelli. L'Anima di san Tommaso, by F. Olgiati. Il Neo-Tomismo in Italia, by A. Masnovo. La Gnoseologia dell' Atto come Fondamento della Filosofia dell' Essere, by G. Zamboni. Introduzione al Corso di Gnoseologia Pura, by G. Zamboni. Vito Fornari, by U. A. Padovani. San Paolo (Text with Introd. and Notes), by G. Gennochi and others. Nuovi Orizzonti della Psicologia Sperimentale, by A. Gemelli. Lettere su la Religione, by M. Casotti. Funzioni e Strutture Psichiche: A. Gemelli. La Prevenzione della Delinquenza: A. Gemelli.

### JOURNALS RECEIVED.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Edited by Ed. Claparède. Geneva.

No. 75. June 1925. (Price 3 fr. 75.) Psychologie et Critique de la Connaissance: J. Piaget. Structure des Récits et L'Interpretation des Images de Dawid chez l'enfant: E. Margairaz et J. Piaget. Doit-on tenir compte des erreurs dans les tests à temps fixe?: P. Bovet. Tests d'Osteretzky pour le développement des fonctions motrices de l'enfant: R. Merkin.

PSYCHE. Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, etc. London. Quarterly. Price 5/-.

July, 1925. Editorial: Behaviourism up to date. Good Sense: E. Boutroux. Our Feelings as a Form of Knowledge: F. Paulhan. Visual Reception: H. Piéron. Is the Universe Finite: B. Russell. Sublimation in the Process of Conversion: S. de Sanctis. Some Aspects of Expression: L. A. Reid. Emotion and Insanity: S. Thalbitzer. Ideography: P. J. Hughesdon. Foreign Intelligence, etc.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Ed. by Professors Woodbridge and Bush. Columbia University. Published fortnightly: four dollars per annum.

Vol. XXII. No. 12. June 4. The Doctrine of Levels: G. P. Conger. Mr. Broad's Questions concerning Critical Realism: D. Drake. No. 13. June 18. Data and Meaning in Cognition: M. T. McClure. Logical Significance of Rediscovered Knowledge: D. S. Robinson. No. 14. July 2. Professional Work as an Ethical Norm: T. V. Smith. Meeting of Western Div: of American Phil: Association: S. P. Lamprecht. Professor Singer's Philosophy of Science: R. M. Blake. No. 15. July 16. Interactions of Beauty and Truth: H. E. Cory. Behaviour: F. J. E. Woodbridge. No. 16. July 30. On Spontaneity: E. A. Singer, Jr. Deity the Implication of Humanity: B. I. Gilman. No. 17. Aug. 13. Mathematics and Credulity: E. T. Bell. Classification and Division: A. C. Benjamin. No. 18. Aug. 27. Contemporary German Philosophy, I: E. Wind. Factual Basis of Mr. Johnson's Logic: H. R. Smart.

SCHOOLING. Teachers College Press, Sydney. Five issues yearly. 5/- per annum. Edited by A. Mackie and P. R. Cole.

Vol. IX. No. 1. Oct. 1925. Editorial Notes. Some Modern Methods of Studying Shakespeare: G. Mackaness. The History Syllabus for Primary Schools: H. L. Harris. Imaginative Thinking and its Place in

Class Teaching: W. G. Lee. The Meaning of Geography: L. G. Woodcock.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Published weekly, 1/-.

THE LEGAL JOURNAL. Sydney. Published monthly, 10/6 per annum.

### NOTES AND NEWS.

The Eighteenth Meeting of the Australasian Association for the advancement of Science will be held at Perth, W.A., during the week commencing 23rd August, 1926. Membership Fee, £1. University students may become Associates on payment of 10/-. There will be sections on Ethnology and Anthropology (President, Professor Wood Jones), Social and Statistical Science (President, Major Giblin), Mental Science and Education (Mr. Peter Board). Papers on these subjects to be sent to the Secretaries of Sections, Perth.

An Italian Psychoanalytic Society was founded at Teramo, in June, 1925. The official organ of the Society is the Archivio Generale di Neurologia Psichatria e Psicoanalisi. All communications to be addressed to Prof. M. Levi-Bianchini, Teramo (Abruzzi), Italy.

At the final meeting of the year of the Sydney Branch of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, held at Sydney University, 1st Oct., Dr. V. A. Bailey, Associate Professor of Physics, read a paper on Prodigious Calculation.

Papers on the following subjects were read at meetings of the Melbourne University Philosophical Society during the past year:—Three Jewish Philosophers (Spinoza, Bergson, Alexander), by Professor Gunn; The Nature of Psychology, by R. Bronner; Descartes and the Cartesian Philosophy, by Rev. D. Atkinson; Sir Henry Jones, by J. E. Owen; Sovereignty and the Modern World, by Dr. S. C. Lazarus.

Mr. R. F. Fortune, M.A., of Victoria University College, has been awarded a National Research Scholarship by the Senate of the University of New Zealand. These Scholarships are awarded for the purpose of enabling research to be carried on in any branch of physical, natural or applied science. This is the first occasion in which one has been awarded to a student undertaking research in Psychology. The subject of Mr. Fortune's research is "Diagnosis of Retardation."

Members of the Association and subscribers who fail to receive the Journal regularly, are requested to communicate with the Honorary Secretary, University of Sydney. Arrangements have been made with the printers of the Journal for the binding of the four numbers of Volume III. These should be sent to Syd. Day, Ltd., Parramatta Road, Sydney, along with the sum of 5/6. For this inclusive charge the bound volume will be sent to the owner within about a month after it has been received.



